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Summary
This dissertation is a collection of research articles according to § 2 Promotionsordnung
(doctoral regulations) of the School of Economics and Management, Leibniz Universita¨t
Hannover. Table 1 provides an overview of these articles, the respective co-authors and the
status of publication. In the following, the four papers will be outlined.
Title Co-authors Journal / Status
Decision heuristics and tax
perception – An analysis of a
tax-cut-cum-base-broadening
policy
Kay Blaufus Journal of Economic
Psychology 35, 1–16Jochen Hundsdoerfer
Dirk Kiesewetter
Joachim Weimann
Perception of income tax
rates: evidence from Germany
Kay Blaufus European Journal of Law and
Economics, online first, doi:
10.1007/s10657-013-9389-9
Jochen Hundsdoerfer
Christian Sielaff
Dirk Kiesewetter
Joachim Weimann
The effect of tax privacy on
tax compliance – An
experimental investigation
Kay Blaufus Under review: Journal of
Economic Behavior &
Organization
Philipp E. Otto
Who bears value added taxes?
Evidence from Germany
—
Working Paper
Table 1: Overview of research articles
Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a
tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy
Many countries have pursued a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy over the past 20–30
years; i.e., these countries have reduced the nominal tax rate and simultaneously increased
the tax base. Usually, traditional economic theory assumes individuals to behave rationally.
Then, it should make no difference whether their tax rate or (by equal measure) their tax
deductions changes. By contrast, if one takes into account the idea that individuals tend to
avoid cognitive strain and instead use simplified decision heuristics there may be difference
in perception.
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether decision heuristics are used in
choosing between tax options that differ, exclusively, in the nominal tax rate and the amount
of tax deductible expenses and whether the use of decision heuristics leads to a misperception
of changes in nominal tax rates compared to changes in tax deductions. To this aim, both (i)
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a survey study (conjoint analysis) with 467 German working individuals that represents the
population in terms of age, education, gender, and income and (ii) a lab experiment with 56
working individuals are conducted. By combining these two methods we are able to benefit
from the respective strengths of both procedures. First of all, conjoint analysis allows
us to draw a large representative sample. Moreover, we are able to measure preferences
on the individual level. This incorporates the advantage of conjoint analysis to identify
whether individuals choose a decision heuristic over the rational ranking. On the other hand,
conjoint analysis is a mere preference measurement whereas a lab experiment sets monetary
incentives, i.e., individuals are compensated according to their experimental performance.
Besides, the lab experiment enables us to establish a learning environment.
In line with behavioral studies incorporating the burden of cognitive strain, our results
reveal that the majority of individuals do not make rational decisions based on the actual tax
burden but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to an irrationally high impact
of changes in nominal tax rates on the perceived tax burden. Taxpayers favor tax options
that apply a lower tax rate on a broad base over a higher tax rate applied on a narrow
base despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. Furthermore, overestimation
of tax rate changes increases considerably when information on tax rate is considered first
(framing effect). Even after the introduction of performance based incentives we observe
that subjects still overestimate nominal tax rate changes. However, we find slight evidence
for learning effects. After the implementation of a learning environment, the use of heuristics
decreases weak significantly, but even after three decisions the majority of subjects do not
make a rational choice.
These results are of particular importance for fiscal policy as they suggest that politicians
could combine increasing fiscal revenues and decreasing subjects’ tax perception. Further-
more, consistent with the identified framing effect, emphasizing the nominal tax rate when
presenting tax options can reduce the perceived tax burden solely through the display for-
mat.
Perception of income tax rates: evidence from Germany
As early as 1960 Schmoelders pointed out how important the perceived tax burden is for
tax policies. Based on his survey he showed that only one-third of the subjects knew their
actual tax burden. However, economic tax research has continued to use almost exclusively
actual tax rates.
The main purpose of our study is to examine whether 50 years later the results of
Schmoelders are still valid. Like Schmoelders, we are interested in both the perceived tax
burden and the relation between the perceived tax burden and the tax burden deemed as
fair. In addition, we expand his work by analyzing determinants of the perceived and the fair
tax burden in more detail. For this purpose, more than 1,000 employed and self-employed
people were interviewed.
Based on this survey data, we measure perceived tax rates by means of four pre-defined
income categories as well as subjects’ own income. We compare these perceived income
tax rates to the actual tax rate, as well as a tax rate that is taken as fair. We can thus
determine whether taxpayers were able to accurately estimate their actual tax burdens. Also,
we analyze the individual taxpayer’s statements regarding whether and to what extent they
feel that the tax burden that they perceive can be considered as fair.
We find Schmoelders’ results to be quite robust over time. For the majority of subjects
the perceived tax burdens significantly deviate from the actual tax burdens. Subjects, on
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average, perceive both the average tax rate based on the pre-defined income categories and
the marginal tax rate based on the own income as too high at lower income levels and too
low at higher income levels. The degree of misperception can be partly explained by the
individual’s level of education, income, and whether the individual included social security
contribution in their income tax rate estimation.
The comparison of the perceived tax burden and the tax burden regarded as fair showed
that subjects considered the tax burden as too high for a pre-defined income of EUR 300,000
or lower, while they considered the tax burden as too low for a pre-defined income of EUR
2 million. The most remarkable aspect is the discrepancy of the tax burden that is regarded
as fair compared to the perceived tax burden, on the one hand, and to the actual burden, on
the other hand. Taxpayers believe it is fair to decrease taxes on the pre-defined income of
EUR 10,000 and to increases taxes on the pre-defined income of EUR 2 million. Contrary,
the tax burden perceived as fair on an income of EUR 10,000 significantly exceeds the
actual tax burden while it is significantly lower for an income of EUR 2 million. Hence, it
is of major importance whether recommendations regarding tax policies are based on the
individuals’ perceived or the actual tax burden. Analyzing the determinants, we can see that
the valuation whether the tax burden is considered fair strongly depends on the subjects
education and age. Accordingly, the higher the education, the higher the probability that
the subject perceives the tax rate as fair. Age affects the perception to the extent that
younger subjects in particular perceive the tax burden as too high.
Finally, our results suggest that, generally, individuals prefer a progressive tax tariff due
to fairness reasons.
The effect of tax privacy on tax compliance – An experimental
investigation
Tax evasion is a problem for all countries. E.g., the tax gap in the United States amounts to
$385 billion for the tax year 2006, alone. For more than a century, there has been an ongoing
debate whether tax evasion can be fight against by publicly disclose tax return information.
While most countries treat tax information confidentially, some countries as Greece and New
Zealand publicly list tax evaders. Even more, the Nordic Countries disclose all tax return
information. The main reason to disclose tax compliance information publicly is to deter
people from evading taxes by threatening them with the shame of being announced as tax
evaders. However, whether a strategy of tax publicity is a successful instrument for fighting
tax evasion is far from obvious.
Social norms may have a considerable impact on tax evasion, too, with individuals com-
plying as long as they believe that tax compliance equals the social norms. However, public
disclosure allows for observing the unethical behavior of others. This is potentially conta-
gious because it may change social norms regarding compliance. Hence, publishing informa-
tion could be a deterrent to tax evasion but simultaneously it could also enhance it. Due to
these potentially opposing effects—increasing shame on the one hand, risk of contagion on
the other—the overall effect of public disclosure on tax compliance remains unclear.
We design a tax game with tax privacy as the treatment variable to investigate the impact
of public disclosure on tax evasion experimentally. The three different levels of tax privacy
ranging from full confidentiality to full publicity. Tax information is either published in
an anonymous manner or photos of subjects are paired with each subject’s tax behavior.
This setting allows for separating both the shame and the contagion effects because only
contagion but not shame should not arise under the anonymous disclosure.
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The overall result is an increase of non-compliance in the absence of tax privacy if infor-
mation is disclosed anonymously. This indicates that the pure observation of non-compliant
behavior could destroy the social norm of compliance and lead to non-compliance. The
results also indicate that the shame effect is not strong enough to override the contagion
effect when both effects are present simultaneously. The results are of particular importance
for fiscal policy because public disclosure may lead to more evasion instead of less, due to
motivational crowding-out of tax morale.
Who bears value added taxes? Evidence from Germany
Value added taxes are levied in all OECD member states with the exception of the United
States, usually raising more than one-fifth of total fiscal revenues. Changing value added
tax rates is a popular and often used tool in fiscal policy. In Germany, value added tax rates
have been changed twice since 2007. First, in 2007 the regular rate was increased from 16 %
to 19 % to enlarge fiscal revenues. Secondly, in 2010 the rate on accommodation services
was cut from the regular rate of 19 % to the reduced rate of 7 % to advance economic growth
after the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
Value added taxes are indirect taxes whose incidence should completely fall to final con-
sumers. However, whether and to what extent tax incidence actually falls on consumers
depends on the degree of tax shifting. From a theoretical perspective, it will completely fall
to consumers on markets with perfect conditions. In the case of imperfect markets a general
prediction cannot be made.
Even though most developed countries levy value added taxes and despite the fact that
these taxes raise an important fraction of total fiscal revenues, empirical evidence on the
incidence of value added taxes is scarce. In particular, there are no studies on tax incidence
for Germany. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to estimate the incidence of value
added taxes based on both the 2007 and the 2010 tax reforms. To this end, difference-in-
differences estimation are applied to German consumer price data.
The results show that consumers have to bear about 44 % of the additional tax burden
after the 2007 reform. In addition, there is incidence for tax shifting being dependent on
the market competitiveness. As theoretically expected consumer shares are higher in more
competitive markets (89 %) compared to less competitive markets (21 %). Finally, in the
case of accommodation services prices respond asymmetrically to tax rate changes. After
the tax rate increase in 2007 about 38 % of the additional tax burden were shifted to final
consumers. In contrast, after the 2010 tax cut the relief is not shifted to consumers at all.
Consumer shares are similar to those from previous empirical research for other European
countries. Contrary, there is clearly less tax shifting compared to the United States sales
tax.
These results are important for fiscal policy because politicians may use them to anticipate
consumer price reactions to future tax rate changes beforehand. Moreover, it is possible to
conclude useful counteractions if requested.
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Zusammenfassung
Bei der vorliegenden Dissertationsschrift handelt es sich um eine kumulative Dissertation
gema¨ß § 2 Promotionsordnung der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨t der Leibniz Uni-
versita¨t Hannover. Die Dissertation besteht aus vier einzelnen Beitra¨gen, die zusammen mit
den jeweiligen Ko-Autoren und ihrem Publikationsstatus in Tabelle 2 aufgelistet sind. Im
Folgenden werden die Beitra¨ge zusammengefasst.
Titel Ko-Autoren Zeitschrift / Status
Decision heuristics and tax
perception – An analysis of a
tax-cut-cum-base-broadening
policy
Kay Blaufus Journal of Economic
Psychology 35, 1–16Jochen Hundsdoerfer
Dirk Kiesewetter
Joachim Weimann
Perception of income tax
rates: evidence from Germany
Kay Blaufus European Journal of Law and
Economics, online first, doi:
10.1007/s10657-013-9389-9
Jochen Hundsdoerfer
Christian Sielaff
Dirk Kiesewetter
Joachim Weimann
The effect of tax privacy on
tax compliance – An
experimental investigation
Kay Blaufus Im Begutachtungsprozess:
Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization
Philipp E. Otto
Who bears value added taxes?
Evidence from Germany
—
Arbeitspapier
Table 2: U¨berblick u¨ber die Forschungsbeitra¨ge
Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a
tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy
In den vergangenen zwanzig bis dreißig Jahren verfolgte eine Vielzahl von Staaten eine
Steuerpolitik, bei der nominale Steuersa¨tze gesenkt und gleichzeitig die steuerliche Bemes-
sungsgrundlage verbreitert werden (”tax-cut-cum-base- broadening”). Unter der klassischen
Annahmen rational handelnder Individuen ist es fu¨r den Steuerpflichtigen unerheblich, ob
der nominale Steuersatz oder (in gleichem Umfang) die Bemessungsgrundlage angepasst wer-
den. Eine unterschiedliche Wahrnehmung ist hingegen mo¨glich, wenn man zula¨sst, dass In-
dividuen vereinfachende Entscheidungsheuristiken zur Vermeidung geistiger Anstrengungen
nutzen.
Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob Individuen bei der Wahl zwischen unterschiedlichen Be-
steuerungsoptionen, die sich ausschließlich im nominalen Steuersatz und der Ho¨he der steuer-
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lichen Bemessungsgrundlage unterscheiden, vereinfachende Entscheidungsheuristiken ver-
wenden, und ob die Verwendung solcher Entscheidungsheuristiken zu einer verzerrten Wahr-
nehmung von A¨nderungen des nominalen Steuersatzes im Vergleich zu A¨nderungen der Be-
messungsgrundlage fu¨hrt. Zu diesem Zweck werden eine Befragung (”Conjoint Analyse”)
mit 467 Erwerbsta¨tigen, die in Bezug auf die Merkmale Alter, Bildung, Geschlecht und
Einkommen repra¨sentativ fu¨r die deutsche Bevo¨lkerung sind, und ein o¨konomisches Labor-
experiment mit 56 erwerbsta¨tigen Personen durchgefu¨hrt. Dies ermo¨glicht die Kombination
der jeweiligen Sta¨rken beider Verfahren. Auf der einen Seite erlaubt die Conjoint Analyse
das Ziehen einer großen repra¨sentativen Stichprobe. Daru¨ber hinaus ko¨nnen Pra¨ferenzen
im Rahmen der Conjoint Analyse auf Individualebene erfasst werden. Das ermo¨glicht eine
Identifikation von Individuen, die ihre Entscheidung anhand einer Heuristik und nicht auf-
grund einer rationalen Reihung treffen. Auf der anderen Seite handelt es sich bei einer
Conjoint Analyse um eine reine Pra¨ferenzmessung, wohingegen ein Laborexperiment durch
leistungsabha¨ngige Vergu¨tungen moneta¨re Anreize setzt. Daru¨ber hinaus ermo¨glicht die
Laborumgebung, Lerneffekte zu quantifizieren.
Unsere Ergebnisse befinden sich im Einklang mit anderen Studien, die Belastungen durch
kognitive Anstrengungen beru¨cksichtigen. Die Mehrzahl der Individuen entscheidet nicht
rational anhand der tatsa¨chlichen Steuerbelastung, sondern nutzt vielmehr vereinfachende
Entscheidungsheuristiken. Als Folge daraus haben Vera¨nderungen des nominalen Steuer-
satzes einen irrational hohen Einfluss auf die gefu¨hlte Steuerbelastung. Steuerpflichtige
bevorzugen Besteuerungsoptionen mit niedrigen Steuersa¨tzen und breiter Bemessungsgrund-
lage gegenu¨ber hohen Steuersa¨tzen bei schmaler Bemessungsgrundlage, selbst wenn die
Belastung in letzterem Fall niedriger ist. Daru¨ber hinaus nimmt die U¨berscha¨tzung von
Vera¨nderungen des Steuersatzes erheblich zu, wenn Informationen zum Steuersatz zuerst
betrachtet werden (”Darstellungseffekte”). Auch bei leistungsabha¨ngiger Vergu¨tung u¨ber-
scha¨tzen die Individuen Vera¨nderungen des nominalen Steuersatzes. Allerdings sind geringe
Lerneffekte erkennbar. Individuen greifen seltener auf Entscheidungsheuristiken zuru¨ck,
aber selbst nach drei Entscheidungen erfolgt die Mehrheit der Entscheidungen noch immer
nicht auf Basis einer rationalen Reihung.
Die Ergebnisse sind fu¨r die Fiskalpolitik von großer Bedeutung. Sie deuten an, dass Poli-
tiker die Staatseinnahmen erho¨hen und gleichzeitig die gefu¨hlte Belastung der Steuerpflichti-
gen senken ko¨nnten. Daru¨ber hinaus erlauben Darstellungseffekte eine Senkung der gefu¨hl-
ten Belastung allein durch eine Fokussierung auf den nominalen Steuersatz.
Perception of income tax rates: evidence from Germany
Bereits 1960 hat Schmo¨lders auf die Bedeutung der gefu¨hlten Steuerbelastung fu¨r die Steuer-
politik hingewiesen. Anhand einer Befragung konnte er zeigen, dass nur ein Drittel der
Befragten die eigene Steuerbelastung u¨berhaupt kennt. Die o¨konomische Steuerforschung
arbeitet allerdings bis heute fast ausschließlich mit der tatsa¨chlichen Steuerbelastung.
Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob die Ergebnisse von Schmo¨lders auch 50 Jahre nach seiner
Untersuchung noch Gu¨ltigkeit besitzen. Analog zu Schmo¨lders werden sowohl die gefu¨hlte
Steuerbelastung als auch die Beziehung zwischen der gefu¨hlten und der fu¨r fair gehal-
tenen Steuerbelastung untersucht. Daru¨ber hinaus erweitert dieser Beitrag die Arbeit
von Schmo¨lders durch eine detaillierte Analyse der Einflussgro¨ßen von gefu¨hlter und fairer
Steuerbelastung. Zu diesem Zweck wurden mehr als 1000 Erwerbsta¨tige befragt.
Auf Basis dieser Befragungsdaten wird die gefu¨hlte Steuerbelastung anhand von vier
vordefinierten Einkommenskategorien sowie des tatsa¨chlichen Einkommens der befragten
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Personen gemessen. Die gefu¨hlten Steuersa¨tze werden sowohl mit dem tatsa¨chlichen Steuer-
satz als auch mit den fu¨r fair gehaltenen Steuersa¨tzen verglichen. Dadurch kann festgestellt
werden, ob die Steuerpflichtigen ihre tatsa¨chliche Steuerbelastung akkurat einscha¨tzen ko¨n-
nen. Daru¨ber hinaus kann anhand der Angaben der Steuerpflichtigen untersucht werden,
ob und inwieweit die gefu¨hlte Steuerbelastung fu¨r fair gehalten wird.
Die Ergebnisse von Schmo¨lders erweisen sich als zeitinvariant. Bei der Mehrheit der Be-
fragten weicht die gefu¨hlte Steuerbelastung signifikant von der tatsa¨chlichen Steuerbelastung
ab. Im Mittel nehmen die Befragten den Durchschnittssteuersatz der vier vordefinierten
Einkommenskategorien ebenso wie den Grenzsteuersatzes des eigenen Einkommens bei nie-
drigeren Einkommen zu hoch und bei ho¨heren Einkommen zu niedrig wahr. Das Ausmaß der
Fehlwahrnehmung kann zumindest teilweise durch Bildung und Einkommen der Befragten
erkla¨rt werden. Daru¨ber hinaus wird die Fehlwahrnehmung durch eine Beru¨cksichtigung
von Sozialversicherungsbeitra¨gen bei der Scha¨tzung der Einkommensteuersa¨tze versta¨rkt.
Ein Vergleich der gefu¨hlten mit der fu¨r fair gehaltenen Steuerbelastung zeigt, dass die
Steuerpflichtigen die Steuerlast fu¨r ein vordefiniertes Einkommen von EUR 300.000 und
weniger als zu hoch erachten, wohingegen sie die Steuerlast bei einem vordefinierten Einkom-
men von EUR 2.000.000 als zu niedrig erachten. Besonders auffallend ist die Diskrepanz zwi-
schen der fu¨r fair gehaltenen und der wahrgenommen Steuerbelastung auf der einen Seite und
der tatsa¨chlichen Steuerbelastung auf der anderen Seite. Die Steuerpflichtigen halten es fu¨r
fair, Steuern bei einem vordefinierten Einkommen von EUR 10.000 zu senken und bei einem
vordefinierten Einkommen von EUR 2.000.000 zu erho¨hen. Im Gegensatz dazu u¨bersteigt die
fu¨r fair gehaltene Steuerbelastung bei einem Einkommen von EUR 10.000 die tatsa¨chliche
Steuerbelastung signifikant, wohingegen sie bei einem Einkommen von EUR 2.000.000 sig-
nifikant niedriger ist. Es ist somit von großer Bedeutung, ob steuerpolitische Empfehlungen
auf der gefu¨hlten oder der tatsa¨chlichen Belastung von Steuerpflichtigen beruhen.
Die Analyse der Einflussgro¨ßen zeigt, dass die Beurteilung einer Steuerbelastung als fair
besonders von Bildung und Einkommen der Befragten abha¨ngt. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit,
dass ein Steuersatz fu¨r fair gehalten wird, steigt mit der Bildung der Befragten an. Ju¨ngere
Steuerpflichtige empfinden die Steuerbelastung besonders als zu hoch.
Schließlich deuten die Ergebnisse daraufhin, dass Steuerpflichtige u¨blicherweise aus Fair-
nessgru¨nden einen progressiven Steuertarif bevorzugen.
The effect of tax privacy on tax compliance – An experimental
investigation
Steuerhinterziehung ist ein Problem, dass alle Staaten gleichermaßen betrifft. Allein fu¨r das
Steuerjahr 2006 bela¨uft sich beispielsweise das Steuerloch in den Vereinigten Staaten auf
$385 Milliarden. Seit mehr als einem Jahrhundert wird daru¨ber diskutiert, ob sich Steuer-
hinterziehung durch die Offenlegung von Steuererkla¨rungsdaten wirksam beka¨mpfen la¨sst.
Wa¨hrend die meisten Staaten Steuerdaten vertraulich behandeln, vero¨ffentlichen Staaten
wie Griechenland und Neuseeland Listen mit Steuerhinterziehern. Die nordischen Staaten
legen daru¨ber hinaus sogar sa¨mtliche steuerlichen Informationen offen. Die Offenlegung
soll Steuerpflichtige, aus Scham als Steuersu¨nder an den Pranger gestellt zu werden, von
Steuerhinterziehung abhalten. Es ist allerdings vollkommen unklar, ob eine solche Politik
im Kampf gegen Steuerhinterziehung wirksam ist.
Auch soziale Normen ko¨nnen einen erheblichen Einfluss auf Steuerhinterziehung haben.
Steuerpflichtige verhalten sich steuerehrlich, solange sie davon ausgehen, dass steuerehrliches
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Verhalten der sozialen Norm entspricht. Allerdings ermo¨glicht die Vero¨ffentlichung steuer-
licher Informationen, unethisches Verhalten anderer zu beobachten. Das kann unter Umsta¨n-
den ansteckend wirken, da es die sozialen Normen in Bezug auf Steuerehrlichkeit vera¨ndern
kann. Daher kann die Offenlegung Steuerhinterziehung sowohl einda¨mmen als auch ver-
sta¨rken. Der Gesamteffekt einer solchen Offenlegungspolitik auf die Einhaltung steuerlicher
Regelungen ist aufgrund der gegensa¨tzlichen Effekte – Scham auf der einen Seite, Ansteckung
auf der anderen – unklar.
Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Einfluss der Offenlegung auf die Steuerhinterziehung expe-
rimentell anhand eines o¨konomischen Spiels. Das Steuergeheimnis fungiert als Treatment-
Variable, die drei verschiedene Formen annehmen kann und von vollsta¨ndiger Geheimhaltung
zu vollsta¨ndiger Offenlegung reicht. Es gibt zwei Stufen der Offenlegung. Auf der ersten
Stufe findet die Offenlegung anonym statt, wohingegen auf der zweiten Stufe Fotos der
Teilnehmer zusammen mit ihrem steuerlichen Verhalten vero¨ffentlicht werden. Aufgrund
dieses Designs ist es mo¨glich, den Scham- und den Ansteckungseffekt zu separieren, da bei
einer anonymen Vero¨ffentlichung zwar Ansteckungs-, jedoch keine Schameffekte auftreten
ko¨nnen.
Insgesamt kann ein Anstieg der Steuerhinterziehung beobachtet werden, wenn steuerliche
Informationen nicht vertraulich behandelt werden. Dieses Ergebnis deutet daraufhin, dass
das reine Beobachten steuerunehrlichen Verhaltens soziale Normen zersto¨ren und zu ver-
mehrter Steuerhinterziehung fu¨hren kann. Daru¨ber hinaus kann geschlossen werden, dass der
Schameffekt nicht ausreicht, den Ansteckungseffekt aufzuheben, wenn beide Effekt gleich-
zeitig auftreten. Diese Ergebnisse sind von erheblicher Bedeutung fu¨r die Steuerpolitik, da
eine Offenlegungspolitik aufgrund einer Verschiebung der Steuermoral Steuerhinterziehung
versta¨rken kann.
Who bears value added taxes? Evidence from Germany
Mehrwertsteuern werden in sa¨mtlichen OECD-Mitgliedsla¨ndern mit Ausnahme der Verei-
nigten Staaten erhoben. Das Steueraufkommen aus der Mehrwertsteuer betra¨gt in diesen
Staaten regelma¨ßig ca. 20 % der gesamten Steuereinnahmen. Die A¨nderung von Mehrwert-
steuersa¨tzen ist ein beliebtes und oft genutztes steuerpolitisches Instrument. In Deutschland
wurden die Mehrwertsteuersa¨tze seit 2007 zweimal gea¨ndert. Zuna¨chst wurde der regula¨re
Mehrwertsteuersatz zum 1. Januar 2007 zur Erho¨hung der Staatseinnahmen von 16 auf 19 %
angehoben. Schließlich wurde der Mehrwertsteuersatz auf Beherbergungsdienstleistungen
zum 1. Januar 2010 vom regula¨ren Satz von 19 % auf den erma¨ßigten Satz von 7 % gesenkt,
um das Wirtschaftswachstum nach der Finanzkrise 2007–2008 zu beschleunigen.
Die Mehrwertsteuer ist eine indirekte Steuer, deren Inzidenz vollsta¨ndig auf den Endver-
braucher fallen sollte. Ob und inwieweit die Steuerinzidenz allerdings tatsa¨chlich auf den
Endverbraucher fa¨llt, ha¨ngt vom Ausmaß der Steueru¨berwa¨lzung ab. Aus theoretischer Sicht
findet auf Ma¨rkten mit vollsta¨ndigem Wettbewerb eine vollsta¨ndige U¨berwa¨lzung auf den
Endverbraucher statt. Auf unvollsta¨ndigen Ma¨rkten ist eine generelle Prognose hingegen
nicht mo¨glich.
Obwohl die meisten Industriela¨nder Mehrwertsteuern erheben und diese einen erheblichen
Anteil an den gesamten Steuereinnahmen dieser La¨nder haben, existieren nur sehr wenige
empirische Studien zur Inzidenz der Mehrwertsteuer. Beitra¨ge zur Inzidenz in Deutschland
fehlen sogar ga¨nzlich. Dieser Beitrag scha¨tzt daher die Inzidenz der Mehrwertsteuer auf Basis
der beiden Reformen 2007 und 2010. Zu diesem Zweck wird eine Difference-in-Differences-
Scha¨tzung mit deutschen Verbraucherpreisdaten durchgefu¨hrt.
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Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Endverbraucher ca. 44 % der zusa¨tzlichen Steuerbelastung
nach der Mehrwertsteuerreform 2007 tragen mu¨ssen. Daru¨ber hinaus kann aus den Ergeb-
nissen geschlossen werden, dass das Ausmaß der Steueru¨berwa¨lzung vom Marktwettbewerb
abha¨ngt. Der Konsumentenanteil ist wie erwartet in wettbewerbsintensiven Ma¨rkten ho¨her
(89 %) als in wettbewerbsschwachen Ma¨rkten (21 %). Schließlich zeigen die Ergebnisse,
dass die Preise fu¨r Beherbergungsdienstleistungen asymmetrisch auf Steuersatza¨nderungen
reagieren. Nach der Steuersatzerho¨hung 2007 werden ca. 38 % der zusa¨tzlichen Steuer-
last auf den Endverbraucher u¨berwa¨lzt, wohingegen die Steuersenkung 2010 nicht an die
Konsumenten weitergereicht wird. Die gescha¨tzten Konsumentenanteile a¨hneln denen em-
pirischer Studien anderer europa¨ischer La¨nder. Im Gegensatz dazu ist die U¨berwa¨lzung
deutlich geringer als im Fall der US sales tax.
Die Ergebnisse sind von besonderer Bedeutung fu¨r die Steuerpolitik. Politiker ko¨nnen
mithilfe der Ergebnisse die Reaktionen von Verbraucherpreisen bei zuku¨nftigen Steuer-
satza¨nderungen antizipieren. Daru¨ber hinaus ko¨nnen bei Bedarf sinnvolle Gegenmaßnahmen
beschlossen werden.
XI

Contents
Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a tax-cut-cum-base-
broadening policy 1
Perception of income tax rates: evidence from Germany 18
The effect of tax privacy on tax compliance – An experimental investigation 20
Who bears value added taxes? Evidence from Germany 39
XIII

Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis
of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy
Kay Blaufus a,⇑, Jonathan Bob a, Jochen Hundsdoerfer b, Dirk Kiesewetter c, Joachim Weimann d
a Leibniz Universität Hannover, School of Economics and Management, Königsworther Platz 1, D-30167 Hanover, Germany
b Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics, Garystr. 21, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
c Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, Sanderring 2, D-97070 Würzburg, Germany
dOtto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, Universitätsplatz 2, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 18 June 2012
Received in revised form 13 December 2012
Accepted 16 December 2012
Available online 7 January 2013
JEL classiﬁcation:
D03
G11
H20
H30
K34
M41
PsycINFO classiﬁcation:
2340
2960
Keywords:
Behavioral public ﬁnance
Decision heuristics
Framing effects
Perceived tax burden
Tax-cut-cum-base-broadening
a b s t r a c t
In this paper, both a conjoint analysis and a lab experiment are conducted to analyze the
inﬂuence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our
results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based
on the actual tax burden but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to an irratio-
nally high impact of changes in nominal tax rates on the perceived tax burden. Taxpayers
favor tax options that apply a lower tax rate on their gross income over a higher tax rate
applied on their net income despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. This
result suggests that politicians could combine increasing ﬁscal revenues and decreasing
subjects’ tax perception. Furthermore, overestimation of tax rate changes increases consid-
erably when information on tax rate is considered ﬁrst (framing effect).
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Following the United Kingdom and the United States, in recent decades, many countries pursue a policy of tax-cut-cum-
base-broadening (OECD, 2010: 11), i.e., they reduce the nominal tax rate and simultaneously increase the tax base. One
recent example is the introduction of a ﬁnal withholding tax on interest income in many OECD countries. These countries
cut the nominal tax rate on capital income but abolish the possibility to deduct capital income-related expenses (Genser
& Reutter, 2007). Moreover, several countries provide explicit tax options that reﬂect the above mentioned tax-cut-cum-
base-broadening policy. Exemplarily, small corporations in Russia may choose between a lower tax rate on their gross
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income and a higher tax rate on their net income. In France and Germany taxpayers may—under certain conditions—choose
whether their dividends are taxed under a progressive tariff based on their net income or under a ﬂat tax based on their gross
income. The aforementioned tax reforms are usually reasoned by expected efﬁciency gains and tax simpliﬁcation (e.g., Kopc-
zuk, 2005). We propose a behavioral approach as an additional explanation as to why politicians pursue such a policy of tax-
cut-cum-base-broadening: the use of decision heuristics that lead to an irrationally high impact of nominal tax rate reduc-
tions on taxpayers’ perceived burden.
Previous economic and psychological research already shows that attitudes toward tax policies are subject to several
biases (McCaffery & Baron, 2004). As early as 1960 Schmölders ﬁnds evidence that a high percentage of entrepreneurs over-
estimate their tax burden (Schmölders, 1960: 84f). Especially, if tax complexity is high or if taxes are non-salient, subjects
make substantial decision errors (Boylan & Frischmann, 2006; Chetty, Looney, & Kroft, 2009; Rupert, Single, & Wright, 2003;
Rupert &Wright, 1998). In addition, research shows that price complexity inﬂuences buyers’ price perceptions and demands.
Breaking down the price into several components (e.g., base price and shipping costs) leads to a decrease in the perceived
price and an increased demand for the corresponding commodity (see Morwitz, Greenleaf, & Johnson, 1998). Krishna and
Slemrod (2003) discuss the potential meaning of these price research results for tax policy and Chetty et al. (2009) ﬁnd that
using prices plus sales tax instead of the net amounts leads to a signiﬁcant reduction in demand. The following article is also
based on this idea and is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst to examine whether the perceived tax burden is dependent upon which
price component (tax rate or tax base) is changed.
The calculation of the tax burden is regarded as a complex task (Kirchler, 2007: 32). As we know from previous research deci-
sion heuristics are used in such complex tasks, particularly. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that subjects will use heu-
ristics in our tax framing. Even though there are papers on the use of decision heuristics in tax contexts (e.g., McCaffery & Baron,
2003), a paper on the relationship between decision heuristics and a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy is missing.
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether the use of decision heuristics leads to a misperception of changes in
nominal tax rates compared to changes in tax deductions. We analyze (i) whether decision heuristics are used in choosing
between tax systems that differ, exclusively, in the nominal tax rate and the amount of tax deductible expenses, (ii) whether
the use of decision heuristics will induce subjects to overemphasize the importance of nominal tax rate changes relative to
changes in the amount of tax deductible expenses, and (iii) whether framing effects drive the misperception of nominal tax
rate changes compared to tax base changes.
To this aim, we conduct (i) a survey study (conjoint analysis) with a sample of German working individuals that repre-
sents the population in terms of age, education, gender, and income and (ii) a lab experiment with working individuals who
are compensated according to their experimental performance. By combining these two methods we are able to beneﬁt from
the respective strengths of both procedures. First of all, conjoint analysis allows us to draw a large (representative) sample.
Moreover, we are able to measure preferences on the individual level. This incorporates the advantage of conjoint analysis to
identify whether individuals choose a decision heuristic over the rational ranking. On the other hand, conjoint analysis is a
mere preference measurement whereas a lab experiment sets monetary incentives. Besides, while in conjoint analysis the
task is performed just once, the lab experiment enables us to execute the task multiple times.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we discuss the effects that decision heuristics may
have on the perceived importance of nominal tax rate changes and derive our hypotheses. The sample, method, and results
are presented in Sections 3 and 4, ‘‘Conjoint Analysis’’ and ‘‘Experimental Validation’’, respectively. A discussion of the results
and the implications for tax policy and research are carried out in Section 5.
2. Hypotheses
We consider hypothetical tax options and put subjects in the position of a choice between these alternatives that, for a
given income, differ only in terms of the nominal tax rate and the allowed deduction of income-related expenses.1 This set-
ting mirrors the often proposed policy option to eliminate itemized deductions (e.g., Pitt & Slemrod, 1989; Slemrod, 1989).
Opposition to itemized deductions is in line with public opinion as 54% of Americans would be willing to give up some deduc-
tions to make the tax system simpler (Tax Foundation, 2005). According to Elffers and Hessing (1997) subjects favor higher stan-
dard deductions over itemized deductions because taxpayers ‘‘prefer being lazy to becoming tired’’. However, our main purpose
is to study whether the use of decision heuristics leads subjects to misperceive nominal tax rate changes compared to tax base
changes. We are not interested in the preferences for tax simpliﬁcation. To control for such preferences subjects are explicitly
informed that each tax system from which they can choose leads to the same compliance effort. Therefore, rational decision
makers choose among these alternatives based on the actual tax burden Bi, which can be written for the ith alternative as
Bi ¼ siY  siDi ð1Þ
where si is the tax rate, Di is the deduction of income-related expenses, and Y > Di is taxable revenue (identical for all
alternatives).
1 It is important to note that we are not looking at tax reform models that differ such that certain economic activities are taxable in one alternative but not
the other. As is well known from literature (see e.g., Willner & Granqvist, 2002) a base-broadening, rate-reducing policy that taxes previously untaxed
opportunities while reducing the tax rate on all taxable opportunities could lead to efﬁciency gains even if tax payments remain the same. By contrast, we are
studying the effect of taxing a single (already taxable) economic activity differently in each tax option.
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Traditional theory assumes that economic subjects do not make arithmetic errors and that the calculations included in
the decision-making process do not require a great deal of cognitive effort.
In contrast, psychological research shows that a human’s cognitive ability is limited and that the calculation of decision
variables causes cognitive strain, making it reasonable for individuals to use simple decision heuristics rather than exact cal-
culations (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Using a decision heuristic may lead to a suboptimal solution that is, however,
individually satisfactory (Simon, 1990). Particularly in tax settings, it seems reasonable to assume that subjects will use heu-
ristics. The calculation of the tax burden is regarded as a complex task and usually causes enormous cognitive strain. Kirchler
summarizes: ‘‘People blame the complexity of the tax law for their feelings of tax incompetence.’’ (Kirchler, 2007: 32). In the
light of tax complexity the advantage of selecting a decision heuristic consists in lower cognitive strain and less time spent
on making the decision.
This leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis to be tested:
H1. The decision among alternatives is not based exclusively on the actual tax burden but rather on the use of decision
heuristics.
One reasonable heuristic is what is known as the anchor heuristic. This heuristic has been observed empirically in several
other contexts (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; McCaffery & Baron, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). According to the anchor heu-
ristic, individuals who estimate a certain value, such as the actual tax burden, begin with a starting value that serves as an
anchor for ﬁnding the estimated value. The disadvantage of this heuristic is that the anchor is consistently overweighted, and
additional information is not adequately included.
The anchor is often chosen by selecting either the information with which the individual is ﬁrst confronted (see Hogarth &
Einhorn, 1992) or the information which is considered most important (Yadav, 1994). The anchor value is then adjusted
(inadequately) based on later information or information that is considered to be less important.
In our opinion, there are several reasons why the tax rate and not the amount of deductible expenses serves as the anchor.
First, information about the nominal tax rate si is, in reality, more readily available than information about the deduct-
ibility of single expenditures. According to the availability bias, people overweight evidence that is easily available (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1973: 211).
Second, in general, tax liability reacts more elastically to changes in the tax rate than to changes in deductions. A 1% increase
in tax rate always leads to a 1% increase in tax liability. However, a 1% decrease in deductions, usually, leads to a tax increase of
less than1%.2 Thus, the amount of income-related expenses to be deducted could be considered less important by some individuals.
Third, the effects of different tax rates on a given income can be easily recognized such that individuals determine the
positive relation between tax rate and income without cognitive strain. By contrast, with the inﬂuence of the deduction
of income-related expenses, there is a negative relation between the tax base and income-related expenses as well as a po-
sitive relation between the tax base and tax liability. The marginal necessary cognitive effort compared to the tax rate effects,
thus, supports the assumption that the tax rate, and not income-related expenses, serves as an anchor.
In addition to the anchor heuristic, the use of a lexicographic heuristic is reasonable (e.g., Brandstaetter, Gigerenzer, &
Hertwig, 2006). Individuals reduce their cognitive effort by ﬁrst evaluating the alternatives based on only one criterion,
and if no decision is possible with this criterion, they apply other criteria. Based on the high relevance of the tax rate pre-
sumed above, we assume that individuals who use a lexicographic heuristic ﬁrst evaluate alternatives based on the tax rate;
only if information regarding tax rates is equivalent they consider deductible expenses.
The use of the mentioned heuristics in combination with the assumption of the perceived high relevance of the tax rate
leads to the following hypothesis:
H2. The effect of changes in the tax rate (changes in the tax base) is overestimated (underestimated) compared to the
rational benchmark.
Extensive behavioral and psychological research shows that human behavior is subject to framing effects (McCaffery & Bar-
on, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Presenting the same option in differentways can alter subjects’ decisions. One example
is that individuals tend to choose the piece of information with which they are ﬁrst confronted as an anchor or as the primary
criterion for the lexicographic heuristic (Blaufus & Ortlieb, 2009; Chrzan, 1994; Moran &Meyer, 2006). Thus, we hypothesize:
H3. Confronting subjects ﬁrst with the tax rate increases the likelihood that subjects overestimate the importance of
changes in the tax rate.
3. Conjoint analysis
3.1. Method
To test the hypotheses H1–H3 formulated in the previous section, we conduct a conjoint analysis. Conjoint analysis is
based on Luce and Tukey (1964). The aim of this method is to derive the inﬂuence of attributes (and their levels) on the total
2 The elasticity equals DiYDi and is always less than one percent if Y > 2Di, which is typically the case.
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utility of a combination of attributes (stimuli). For this purpose, subjects are given various stimuli to evaluate. Conjoint anal-
ysis is a decomposition method in which the estimation of inﬂuence (part-worth utilities of attribute levels, relative impor-
tance of attributes) is based on empirically collected total utility of the respective stimuli (see Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson,
2008).
The subjects’ task in conjoint analysis is to rank several of these stimuli according to their personal preferences.3 The sub-
jects assign the lowest (highest) rank to the stimulus with the highest (lowest) preference. The total utility of the stimuli is de-
rived from the individual ranking by each subject. For this purpose, the stimulus with the lowest (highest) rank is assigned the
highest (lowest) utility. Metric part-worth utility for the attribute levels is determined using the calculated total utility and the
ordinary least squares method.4 As is standard in conjoint analysis, we assume an additive model for the relation between total
utility and part-worth utility, i.e., the sum of the part-worth utilities of a stimulus corresponds to its total utility. This follows
from the basic assumption that the explanatory variables do not interact (see Hair et al., 2008).5 This leads to the following
relationship:
Ui;j ¼ li þ
XK
k¼1
bk;ixk;j þ ej ð2Þ
where Ui,j represents the total utility of the jth stimulus for the ith subject. l is the constant, and bk,i are the part-worth util-
ities of the attribute levels. The dummy variables xk,j take on a value of one if the observed stimulus contains the respective
attribute level. ej is the error term.
As can be seen in Eq. (2), the part-worth utilities are estimated on the subjects’ level. To compare and aggregate the part-
worth utilities among subjects, they have to be standardized (Green & Krieger, 1985, 3f). For this purpose, the highest total
utility is set to the value of one while the lowest total utility is set to zero. Hence, the sum of the most preferred level of each
attribute is one, whereas standardized part-worth utilities of the fewest preferred levels are all set to zero. The relative
importance of each attribute equals the part-worth utility of the most preferred level for this attribute. The more the total
utility of a stimulus changes when the level varies for a given attribute, the higher is the relative importance.
Conjoint analysis is predominantly used in marketing research. However, conjoint analysis has also been used to measure
tax effects (e.g. Blaufus & Ortlieb, 2009; Hundsdoerfer & Sichtmann, 2009; Milliron & Toy, 1988; O’Neil, 1982). The idea is to
deﬁne tax characteristics (e.g. tax rate and deductible expenses) as attributes of products. Traditional conjoint analysis6 al-
lows to estimate the relative importances of these tax characteristics at the subject level (see Green & Srinivasan, 1978: 104)
and compare the measured importances with the importances for a ‘‘rational’’ taxpayer. For this purpose, the part-worth utility
of a tax characteristic for a ‘‘rational’’ tax payer will be compared with the actual measured part-worth utility. Thus, we can
identify whether subjects misperceive the impact of changes in speciﬁc tax characteristics like the nominal tax rates.
A further advantage of conjoint analysis is the simultaneous evaluation of the attributes. Alternatively, one could directly
ask subjects for the value they attach to an attribute. This sequential evaluation has the disadvantage that subjects tend to
neglect the trade-off effects. All attributes are considered to be very important and hence, the importance of the individual
attribute is overrated. Contrary, because of the simultaneous evaluation of the attributes in conjoint analysis subjects must
keep in mind the trade-off effects between attributes which also exist in reality.
3.2. Sample
A total of 467 working individuals are interviewed whomatch the population in terms of the following attributes: gender,
age, education, and monthly net income. The selection of working individuals ensures that subjects have experience with
income taxation.
Trained interviewers conduct standardized face-to-face interviews that last an average of 20 min. In addition to conjoint
analysis, subjects are asked questions regarding demographic attributes, general attitudes toward tax policy, current German
income tax law, and tax complexity.
The sample is drawn based on a quota schedule,7 as a pure random sample was not feasible ﬁnancially. The quota param-
eters are based on the following four attributes: age, gender, education, and monthly net income. The corresponding frequency
3 This ranking is the most common valuation procedure after the rating scale. An overview of various procedures is given in Green and Srinivasan (1978,
104).
4 The subjects’ preference judgments, expressed through their rank ordering, have an ordinal measurement level. Hence, one can apply a monotone variance
analysis. However, the least squares method has proven to be very robust in the estimation of part-worth utility values also in the case of ordinally scaled
dependent variables (see e.g. Green & Krieger 1993, 478).
5 Eq. (1) leads to an (at least theoretical) interaction between the two attributes tax rate and income-related expenses. However, by assuming the rational
valuation of a homo economicus, this is a no-crossover interaction (see Green & Devita, 1974, 56). Thus, in line with previous research, the interaction can be
neglected in the following analysis (see Carmone & Green, 1981, 93).
6 Other conjoint analysis procedures (e.g. Choice Based Conjoint Analysis) do not allow for an estimation of preferences on the individual level and are
therefore unsuitable for the purpose of our study. Related models for preference measurement, such as the Rank-Ordered Logit, allow for estimation on the
individual level but require subject speciﬁc attributes in addition to the attributes of the stimuli, which distinguish the evaluation of the stimuli attributes by
the subjects. See Allison & Christakis, 1994, 202.
7 Quota samples do not strictly fulﬁll the requirements of a pure random selection. Nevertheless, it is the most widely used procedure in marketing research
and continuously yields good results in comparative studies with pure random selection (see Green, Tull, & Albaum, 1988, 325–327).
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in the population is taken from the Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Statistical Ofﬁce in Germany, which covers the 37 million
people who make up Germany’s working population.
Compliance with the quota is statistically tested by a chi-squared test. With a margin of error of 5%, no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between population and sample can be detected. In this respect, the sample can be seen as representative of the work-
ing population in Germany. The distribution of attributes in the sample is given in Table 11 Appendix A.
Of the 467 polled individuals, 33 favor high tax rates and non-deductibility of income-related expenses. Because the sin-
cerity of this stated preference is doubtful,8 these individuals are not included in the analysis. The adjusted sample, therefore,
includes 434 individuals who also match the population in terms of gender, age, education, and monthly income.
3.3. Research design and operationalization of the hypotheses
Subjects are asked to rank various tax systems according to their individual preferences. For this purpose, subjects are
asked to assume they receive taxable earnings (an interest payment) of € 10000 and bear income-related expenses of
€ 2000. The individual tax systems differ solely in terms of tax rate si and allowable deductions of income-related expenses
Di and, therefore, in terms of tax burden Bi, which can be calculated using Eq. (1).
Interviewers explain this income should be considered as the respondents’ own income, and that every tax system leads
to the same compliance effort (‘‘time required for the tax return’’).
The stimuli are presented using the Full Proﬁle Method, i.e., each stimulus exhibits a combination of the two attributes
(tax rate and deduction of income-related expenses). Three levels are chosen to express the tax rate (low, medium, high), and
two levels are selected for income-related expenses (no deduction, full deduction). This combination of levels yields a max-
imum of six (3  2) different stimuli.9 The corresponding complete design is presented in Fig. 1.10
The individual stimuli are given to the subjects in the form of randomly ordered laminated cards. The random issuance of
the stimuli ensures that the order of presentation has no inﬂuence on the valuation (regarding the ‘‘sequencing effect’’ see
e.g., Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988: 304).
Subjects are asked to arrange the cards on a magnetic board in previously numbered positions according to their prefer-
ences. Before the subjects begin, the interviewer explains the terms ‘‘tax rate’’ and ‘‘income-related expenses’’ as well as their
Fig. 1. Stimuli used in conjoint analysis.
8 For instance, some subjects simply ranked the stimuli alphabetically. An examination showed that the exclusion of these so called reversals had no
inﬂuence on the presented results.
9 In addition to the two attributes of tax rate and tax base, the stimuli contained a third attribute (‘‘time required for the tax return’’), which is not relevant in
the current study, and which only serve as a control in the current study. No signiﬁcant differences can be detected between the stimuli used and the control
stimuli.
10 Two different stimuli sets are used to test whether the amount of tax rates and income-related expenses inﬂuences subject’s decision. These two sets
differ in the differences between the particular tax rates and expenses. The values on the second stimuli set amount to 25%, 27%, and 29% (tax rate) as well
as € 0 and € 1000 (income-related expenses). Of course, rational rankings stay unchanged.
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effects on the tax burden using the numbers given in the actual decision task. Furthermore, subjects are made aware of the
‘‘objectively best tax alternative’’, which is shown on card D (see Fig. 1).11 They then have to rank only the remaining alter-
natives according to their given income. After the subjects conduct the rankings, the interviewer offers the subjects a chance to
review their choices. After the subjects made their ﬁnal choices, the interviewer records the ﬁnal preference ranking.
The subjects’ rankings serve to test whether the individuals conduct the rankings rationally—according to the actual tax
burden—or whether they use decision heuristics (hypothesis H1).
To test whether changes in tax rates are overestimated (hypothesis H2), the ranking is used to estimate part-worth util-
ities and relative importances. To this aim, we compare the results of our sample with the rational benchmark of the ‘‘homo
economicus’’ and consider the relative importance to be overrated if and only if it exceeds the rational benchmark
signiﬁcantly.
For testing hypothesis H3, we use a between-subject design with the independent variable ‘‘framing effect’’. In the ﬁrst
group the tax rate is the ﬁrst information mentioned, while in the second group it is mentioned last. The stimuli used in the
ﬁrst of the two groups are given in Fig. 1 (tax rate mentioned ﬁrst). The stimuli used in the second group are the same except
for the permutation of the item order.
Subjects are randomly divided into two groups. The 190 subjects in the ﬁrst group are ﬁrst presented with the attribute
‘‘nominal tax rate’’, the 244 subjects in the second group are ﬁrst presented with the attribute ‘‘tax deductible expenses’’.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Analysis of ranking behavior (Hypothesis H1)
To test hypothesis H1, we analyze whether the empirically observed rank order of the stimuli matches the prediction of
the rational model. ‘‘Calculating’’ rational investors minimize their tax burden. Tax burdens of the six stimuli can be calcu-
lated using Eq. (1) and are shown in Table 1.
The rational ranking is given as follows:
D  B  F  E  A  C:
To reduce cognitive strain, the individuals may use a simple heuristic instead of computation. In Section 2 the anchor heu-
ristic and lexicographic heuristic are highlighted. If individuals rank lexicographically ﬁrst according to tax rate and subse-
quently according to income-related expenses, then the following ranking, which differs from the rational ranking, results:
D  F  B  A  E  C:
Although we predict that the lexicographic ranking uses the tax rate as the ﬁrst criterion, it should be tested whether
there are individuals whose lexicographic ranking uses income-related expenses as the primary decision criterion. If the
stimuli are lexicographically ranked ﬁrst according to deduction of income-related expenses and then to tax rate, we would
expect the following ranking results:
D  B  E  F  A  C:
We choose appropriate values permitting a clear distinction between rational and lexicographic ranking. An overview of
the proportion of rankings in the sample is shown in Table 2.
From Table 2, it is apparent that a surprising number, more than 90% of the subjects, decide against the rational ‘‘homo
economicus’’ ranking. Only 9.4% (41 individuals) follow the predictions based on the model of rational net income maximi-
zation.12 Hypothesis H1 is, therefore, conﬁrmed.
Using a logistic regression, we test for demographic factors as age, gender, education, tax knowledge, and income to dis-
tinguish between the different groups of subjects, i.e. those subjects who rank their stimuli rational, those who use a lexi-
cographic heuristic and those who prefer other rankings. Tax knowledge was measured in three different ways. First,
11 The indication of the objectively best alternative, and in the case of the six control cards (see Fn. 10) also of the objectively worst alternative, served to
reduce the work of the subjects.
Table 1
Tax burden.
Stimulus Tax burden (€)
A 3000
B 2400
C 3500
D 2000
E 2800
F 2500
12 The probability of randomly achieving a rational sequence is 0.83%. A binomial test shows that the percentage of the rational sequence cannot be the result
of pure random selection (p < 0.01).
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subjects’ were asked to self-assess their tax knowledge. Second, we asked subjects questions on the current actual income
tax tariff. Third, we asked whether subjects self-prepare their tax return.13 As it can be seen from Table 3, only tax knowledge
could explain the subject’s decision. Participants who self-prepared their last tax return (who have very good knowledge of tax
law) choose around twice (three times) as likely the rational ranking. All other demographic variables are not signiﬁcant.
Table 2 also shows that more than half of the subjects rank the stimuli lexicographically. One-third of all subjects order
the tax systems lexicographically with tax rate the primary criterion. Contrary to our assumption, 21.7% of the individuals
use a lexicographic heuristic in which income-related expenses are the dominant criterion. The probability of randomly
achieving one of the two lexicographic sequences is 1.7%. Of the group of 434 subjects, seven could have arrived at a lexi-
cographical sequence by randomly ordering the stimuli. Thus, one can assume that the two lexicographical heuristics are
consciously chosen.14
These explanations point out that we can easily explain the behavior of two-thirds of our respondents. However, one-
third chose a ranking that was neither rational nor lexicographical. In the next subsection, we show that the use of the an-
chor heuristic seems to be the most reasonable explanation for the remaining rankings.
3.4.2. Overestimation of the importance of changes in tax rate (Hypothesis H2)
According to hypothesis H2, the use of heuristics leads to an overestimation of the relative importance of the tax rate. Our
approach is to estimate part-worth utilities by Eq. (2) using OLS and to compare the results of our sample with the rational
benchmark of the ‘‘homo economicus’’
bUi;j ¼ l^i þ b^1;ix1;j þ b^2;ix2;j þ b^3;ix3;j:
x1,j to x3,j are dummy variables for the low tax rate, the medium tax rate and the full deduction of income-related expenses,
respectively.
Table 2
Percentage of subjects per ranking.
Sequence Subjects (%)
Rational 9.4
Lexikographic
1st tax rate, 2nd income-related expenses 35.0
1st income-related expenses, 2nd tax rate 21.7
Other sequences 33.9
Total 100.0
13 The associated questions are:
1. How do you assess your own knowledge regarding tax law? Possible answers are ‘‘No knowledge’’, ‘‘Some basic knowledge’’, and ‘‘Good or very good
knowledge’’.
2. How high do you rate the income tax burden in percent of the respective annual income? Respective incomes are: € 10000; € 40000; € 300000; and
€ 2000000. We compare subjects’ answers with the actual tax burden according to the income tax tariff and compute the absolute value of subjects’ error
for every income category. The 5% of our subjects with the lowest total error about all four income categories are marked with ‘‘very good knowledge of
tax law’’.
3. Who prepared your last tax return?Possible answers are: ‘‘On my own’’, ‘‘Someone else in the household’’, ‘‘A tax advisor’’, ‘‘Did not ﬁle a tax return’’,
‘‘Other’’.
Table 3
Logistic regression: determinants of a rational ranking.
Dependent variable: rational sequence (dummy) b coef. Std. error b coef. Std. error b coef. Std. error
Constants 2.217*** 0.709 2.144*** 0.688 2.136*** 0.692
With university-entrance qualiﬁcation 0.193 0.356 0.187 0.358 0.28 0.352
Above average knowledge of tax law (self-assessment) 0.190 0.523
Very good knowledge of tax law (income tax rates) 1.236 0.565
Tax return self-prepared 0.806** 0.374
Gender 0.153 0.344 0.073 0.341 0.075 0.346
Age 0.011 0.015 0.008 0.014 0.007 0.014
Self-employed 0.046 0.531 0.033 0.537 0.133 0.532
Net income < 1000 €/month 0.422 0.377 0.233 0.367 0.260 0.365
N 430 430 430
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.031 0.015 0.012
b coef., b coefﬁcients; Std. error, Standard error.
** Indicates signiﬁcance on the 5% level.
*** Indicates signiﬁcance on the 1% level.
14 In this case, a binomial test also conﬁrms that the percentage of lexicographical sequences cannot be the result of pure random selection (p < 0.01).
K. Blaufus et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 35 (2013) 1–16 7
The standardized part-worth utilities, as well as the relative importance that result from the sample of working individ-
uals, are shown in Table 4, along with the part-worth utilities and relative importance of a ‘‘homo economicus’’ which serve
as the rational benchmark (Hundsdoerfer, Sielaff, Blaufus, Kiesewetter, & Weimann, in press).
As it is shown in Table 4, the relative importance of tax rate changes is 12.5 percentage points higher than the importance
of tax base changes. Therefore, tax rates have a stronger impact on the tax burden than tax deductions. However, by eval-
uating individuals’ preferences we only consider the relative importance of the tax rate to be overrated if it exceeds the ra-
tional benchmark signiﬁcantly. Table 4 shows that the part-worth utility of the low tax rate and the relative importance of
the attribute nominal tax rate are higher in the sample. Hence, a change in the nominal tax rate results in a greater change of
total utility. Whereas for a rational agent we observe a relative importance of 56% for the tax rate, the corresponding relative
importance of the subjects is on average 63%. This difference is highly signiﬁcant (Mann–Whitney U, p < 0.01).15 Hypothesis
H2 is, therefore, conﬁrmed: the importance of changes in tax rates is overestimated, and the importance of changes in the tax
base is underestimated.
However, it must be noted that the degree of overestimation can vary widely. The relative importance of the tax rate for
individuals who conduct rankings lexicographically based primarily on the tax rate can amount to 80%, whereas the relative
importance for the tax rate for other types of ranking only amounts to 63%. In addition, 32.5% of the individuals underesti-
mate the relative importance of tax rates. This includes primarily those who rank the stimuli ﬁrst according to income-re-
lated expenses and, therefore, attach a relative importance of only 40% to tax rates.
One should note the relative importance of the tax rate of 63% for the ‘‘other sequences’’ rankings. These individuals sig-
niﬁcantly overestimate the relative importance of the tax rate. As we pointed out in the last section, one approach to explain
the ‘‘other sequences’’ rankings is the anchor heuristic. By thinking of individuals who use this heuristic and choose the tax
rate as an anchor, one should expect a relative importance that is below the importance of lexicographic rankings (those who
rank ﬁrst according to the tax rate) but above the importance of the rational ranking. This is exactly what we observe in this
case. Moreover, it becomes obvious that these subjects do not randomly rank the stimuli because the relative importance of
the attributes differs signiﬁcantly from 50% (sign test, p < 0.01).
3.4.3. Framing effects (Hypothesis H3)
To identify factors that explain the importance of the tax rate, we test whether framing effects increase the misperception
of nominal tax rate changes. Therefore, we compute the relative importance for the two respective groups (tax rate men-
tioned ﬁrst/tax rate mentioned last). The framing effect can be quantiﬁed as the difference in relative importance for the
two settings ‘‘tax rate mentioned ﬁrst’’ and ‘‘tax rate mentioned last’’. The resulting values are shown in Table 5 below.
As it can be seen from Table 5, the importance of the tax rate is overestimated and the importance of the expense deduction is
underestimated in both groups. The deviations from the rational conclusion are highly signiﬁcant (Mann–Whitney U, p < 0.01).
One can also see from Table 5 that the overestimation of the importance of the tax rate is signiﬁcantly larger (Mann–
Whitney U, p < 0.01) when the subjects are presented the tax rate ﬁrst. The relative importance of the tax rate is 70% when
Table 4
Part-worth and relative importance (sample and rational sequence).
Estimated part-worth Relative importance
Rational Sample Rational Sample
Low tax rate 0.5625 0.6331 0.5625 0.6331
Medium tax rate 0.2812 0.3166
High tax rate 0.0000 0.0000
High deduction of income-related expenses 0.4375 0.3669 0.4375 0.3669
Low deduction of income-related expenses 0.0000 0.0000
The difference between the samples’ relative importance of the tax rate (0.6331) and the rational value (0.5625) is signiﬁcant as a Mann–Whitney-U test
shows (p < 0.01).
15 In the following, solely the relative importance of the attribute ‘‘nominal tax rate’’ will be examined, as this can be used to derive all further values. The
relative importance values add up to one. Hence, the relative importance of the attribute ‘‘allowable deduction of income-related expenses’’ is given by: 1
minus the relative importance of the ‘‘nominal tax rate.’’ In addition, the largest standardized part-worth utility of an attribute level always corresponds to the
relative importance of this attribute. The standardized part-worth utility of the middle tax rate can be calculated as half of the relative importance of the tax
rate.
Table 5
Relative importances of tax rate.
Tax rate named ﬁrst Tax rate named last
0.6996 0.6021
Both values are compared to the rational value of 0.5625. The differences are signiﬁcant according to a Mann–
Whitney-U test (p < 0.01).
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mentioned ﬁrst and only 60% when mentioned last. Thus, hypothesis H3 is conﬁrmed. The framing effect amounts to 10 per-
centage points. As we mentioned in section ‘‘Hypotheses’’ individuals tend to choose the piece of information with which
they are ﬁrst confronted as an anchor or as the primary criterion for the lexicographic heuristic. This explains the large fram-
ing effect. The percentage of subjects with a lexicographical ranking with tax rate as ﬁrst criterion increases from 25% to 48%
when the tax rate is mentioned ﬁrst. In the same way the percentage of subjects with a lexicographical ranking with tax
deductible expenses as ﬁrst criterion increases from 13% to 28% when the tax rate is mentioned last.
3.4.4. Choice between tax options
The subjects are presented with the various alternatives as possible options for tax policy. Since we focus on tax changes
only, we implicitly consider other political factors such as environmental policy, economic policy, or health care as constant
among the alternatives. In our view, this assumption is particularly appropriate in situations where taxpayers can choose
between different tax options as long as the choice does only affect themselves. Basically, in our setting this choice is
whether to tax net income at a higher tax rate or gross income at a lower tax rate. This reﬂects for example the alternatives
of smaller corporations in Russia. These corporations can choose between a tax rate of 6% on their sales (gross income) and a
tax rate of 15% on their earnings (net income). Besides, there are several other countries as France and Germany that provide
similar tax options with respect to dividend income. In these countries taxpayers can choose between the usual progressive
tariff applied on their net dividend and a ﬂat tax on their gross dividend.
To examine how taxpayers will choose between such tax options, a further assumption must be made about the relation
between the ranking order (preference) of the individual and the individual’s actual choice. We consider a deterministic
model (‘‘ﬁrst choice’’). Thus, the probability of choosing the most strongly preferred stimulus is one. All other stimuli have
a choice probability of zero. The total percentage of a tax option corresponds to the number of subjects with ﬁrst preference
for this respective tax option divided by the total number of subjects. The percentages using the ﬁrst choice model are shown
in Table 6.16 It shows that the absolute majority of choices are allotted to stimulus F even though this does not have the lowest
actual tax burden. If the ﬁrst choice model accurately describes choice behavior, then politicians could combine increasing tax
revenues with a decrease in the perceived tax burden. This can be achieved by introducing tax options into tax law that allow
taxpayers to decide between a higher tax rate on their net income and a lower tax rate on their gross income. Obviously, tax-
payers could avoid wrong choices by consulting tax advisors. However, according to our data only 22% of the subjects actually
consult a tax advisor for their last tax return.
4. Experimental validation
As we pointed out before, conjoint analysis comes with its own strengths and weaknesses. On one hand, we have the
advantages of drawing a large (representative) sample, measuring preferences on the individual level and identify decision
heuristics. On the other hand, conjoint analysis in practice does not allow for performance based incentives or repeated task
execution. Hence, the results we reveal in the previous section are subject to these objections. Therefore, in the present sec-
tion we validate our survey results by a lab experiment.
4.1. Method and sample
We apply a computer-based lab experiment that is programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). While the basic setting matches the conjoint analysis, there are two main differences that address the limitations
of conjoint analysis. First, we introduce performance based compensation and second, we establish a learning environment.
The experiment took place at the European University Viadrina and the Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Subjects are 56
non-academic university employees. In contrast to a convenient student sample this subject pool has the advantage that
employees come with actual tax experience. Most of the non-academic employees at the European University Viadrina
and the Freie Universität Berlin, Germany are women. This is also reﬂected in our sample as 50 out of 56 are females. Sub-
jects are on average 44.1 years of age. This corresponds to the average age of the subjects that take part in conjoint analysis.
The average education level is slightly higher in the lab experiment compared to the subjects that participated in the conjoint
analysis.
Table 6
Choice between tax options.
Position Stimulus Choices (%) Tax burden (€)
1 F 55.10 2500
2 B 44.40 2400
3 E 0.50 2800
4 A 0.00 3000
5 C 0.00 3500
Total percentages according to the ﬁrst choice model.
16 Stimulus D was eliminated from the analysis because it was given as the objectively best alternative. Thus, stimulus D could not be selected by the subjects.
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4.2. Research design
According to conjoint analysis subjects have to choose between tax systems that differ only in terms of the nominal tax
rate and the allowed deduction of income-related expenses for a given income.
While income is hypothetical in conjoint analysis, subjects that take part in the experiment have to perform a working
task to receive income. This eliminates a potential house money effect.17
We design a simple decoding task where subjects have to decode letters into numbers according to a given table. Subjects
receive 400 points for every correct entered number and are allowed to accomplish up to 25 successful decodings to receive
at most 10000 points, which equals the earnings of € 10000 used in the conjoint analysis.
We limit the time subjects have to complete the task to a maximum of 10 min and charge subjects corresponding to the
elapsed time. Thus, we are able to generate income-related expenses. There was a ﬁx charge of 3000 points if subjects suc-
cessfully earn 10000 points in the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes. For every 30 s surpassing the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes subjects are charged with
additional 100 points.
To avoid any income effects on the results, it is required that all subjects have the same income available. Pretests showed
that almost everybody should be able to complete the decoding task within ﬁve minutes. With only one exception all sub-
jects earn 10000 points and bore income-related expenses of 3000 points.18
After completing the task subjects are made aware of their working task income. Afterwards, they are presented eight
different tax systems which differ only in tax rates (25%, 30%, and 35%) and deductions allowed (100%, 33%, and 0% of income
related expenses).19 Subjects are told to choose the tax option on the basis of which they want their own income to be taxed
and that their decision does not affect the taxation of any other participant in the experiment.20
While subjects have to rank all tax options in conjoint analysis, they only have to choose one in the experiment. This is
due to the fact that a performance based reward is required. To ensure that these rewards control for individuals’ preferences
saliency is needed. This means subjects must be aware of the relationship between decisions and incentives. Moreover, the
relationship between decisions and incentives has to be understandable rather than too complex. Then and only then, sub-
jects can recognize how their payoff is affected by their actions. At ﬁrst glance, it seems to be pretty easy to ﬁnd a perfor-
mance rewarding payoff structure that leads to higher payoff for the rational ranking than for other rankings. However, one
has to consider the 120 different ways to rank the stimuli from our conjoint analysis. There are too many issues to adapt a
payoff structure that fulﬁlls the demand for saliency. Therefore, subjects only choose their personal best tax option.
As in conjoint analysis the objectively best tax option is excluded, i.e., subjects choose only among the remaining eight
options. Subsequent to their choice, subjects receive an extensive feedback. They are not only informed on their pre-tax, tax-
able, and net income, but even calculations are displayed. So the participants receive all the information needed to ﬁnd the
tax option with the lowest tax burden. The working task as well as the choice of the tax option is repeated three times in
exactly the same manner. Screenshots of the experiment are displayed in Figs. 2 to 4 in Appendix B. The instructions are
presented in Appendix C.
Subjects are compensated according to their net income. Net income is calculated as earned points less income-related
expenses less taxes. Since the ﬁrst two components are the same for all subjects, the choice of the tax option determines
the payoff. To enforce the incentive, there are large differences in compensation between the respective tax options. Choos-
ing the tax option with the lowest tax burden yields a return of € 8.00, while choosing the second best option is awarded with
a return of € 5.00. For choosing any other than these two tax options subjects are paid € 2.00. Hence, choosing the tax option
Table 7
Aggregated ranking of tax options.
Stimulus Tax rate (in %) Tax deductible expenses (in %) Tax Burden (in €) Rational ranking Sample ranking
1 25 33.3 2250 2 3
2 25 0 2500 4 2
3 30 100 2100 1 1
4 30 33.3 2700 5 5
5 30 0 3000 6 6.5
6 35 100 2450 3 4
7 35 33.3 3150 7 6.5
8 35 0 3500 8 8
Stimuli 5 and 7 receive the same number of choices. Therefore, they are allotted the same rank which is the average of rank 6 and rank 7.
17 As it is shown in the literature subjects are more involved if their income is not given but earned. This is called the house money effect (Clark, 2002).
18 Since results were not affected by this subject, we did not exclude her from our study.
19 In conjoint analysis we used three levels for the attribute ‘‘tax rate’’ and two levels for the attribute ‘‘income related expenses’’. Some studies report that
attributes with more levels achieve a higher relative importance (e.g. Wittink, Lakshman, & Reibstein, 1990). To ensure that our results are unaffected by such a
‘‘level effect’’ we decided to validate our conjoint results with a design that contains the same number of levels for both attributes.
20 In a post experimental manipulation check we asked whether the subjects understand that their choice for a certain tax option does only affect their own
experimental income and is independent from the other participants. On a scale from 1 (does not apply) to 7 (does apply) 40 out 56 participants name a 6 or
higher. The average (median) answer is 5.63 (6) with a standard deviation of 1.75.
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with the lowest tax burden thrice leads to the maximum total payment of € 24.00. Since subjects are paid at least € 2.00 for
every decision, the minimum total payment amounts up to € 6.00. On average subjects earned a total of € 15.67 (Std. Dev. €
5.86) for an experiment lasting on average 50 min.
The experiment is designed as a validation whether the conjoint analysis results regarding hypothesis H2 are robust with
respect to performance based incentives and learning effects. To test whether performance based incentives affect the results
from the conjoint analysis, we again use a conjoint analysis to look at the impact of changes in nominal tax rate and tax base.
To test whether the implementation of a learning environment changes the results we use a within-subject-design and
apply generalized estimation equation to compare subjects’ ﬁrst choice with their subsequent choices.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. Overestimation of the importance of changes in tax rate (Hypotheses H1 and H2)
In the analysis of subjects’ ranking behavior in Section 3, we point out that only 9.4% of our subjects rank all of the stimuli
rationally. In the experiment subjects do not have to rank all of them but only have to choose one. Due to this change in our
design an individual ranking cannot be obtained. Thus, to conduct a conjoint analysis we aggregate subjects’ choices. We
obtain the ranking by assigning the stimulus with the highest total percentage of choices the ﬁrst rank, the stimulus with
the second highest total percentage the second rank, and so on. To avoid any impact of learning effects we only consider
choices from the ﬁrst of the three periods. The number of choices for each stimuli is given in Table 12 in Appendix B.
As it can be seen from Table 7, the stimulus with the lowest tax burden is chosen most often. However, the aggregated
sample ranking deviates from the rational ranking. In fact, only roughly a third of the subjects (18 out of 56) choose the tax
option with the lowest tax burden. The result regarding hypothesis H1 is unaffected by the implementation of performance-
based incentives. Even after the implementation of performance-based incentives the majority of the subjects does not
choose their tax option based on the actual tax burden.
To test whether performance-based incentives change our results regarding hypothesis H2, we estimate part-worth util-
ities by Eq. (2) using OLS and compare the results of our aggregated ranking with the rational benchmark. The results are
given in Table 8.
As it can be seen from Table 8, the relative importance of the nominal tax rate for the rational benchmark amounts to 46%,
while the corresponding relative importance of the sample is 56%. The relative importance of the rate is 10 percentage points
higher in the sample than for the homo economicus. As it is for hypothesis H1, the results regarding hypothesis H2 remain
unaffected by the implementation of performance-based incentives.
4.3.2. Learning effects
Subjects have to choose their individual tax option thrice. As pointed out before, subjects receive an extensive feedback
after each decision. The feedback does not only contain information on subjects’ income, but even on calculations. For our
analysis, we divide subjects’ decisions into two groups. The ﬁrst group contains the subjects’ ﬁrst decisions, since these
choices are carried out before the ﬁrst feedback. The second group consists of the second and third decisions, respectively.
These choices are made after receiving at least one feedback.21
In the ﬁrst period, 18 out of 56 subjects choose the tax option with the lowest tax burden (see Table 9 below). This equals
32%. After receiving feedback on their decisions 50 out of 112 (45%) decisions in the last two runs are in favor of the tax op-
tion with the lowest tax burden. The difference in favor of the performance in the last two periods is weakly signiﬁcant (chi
squared test, p = 0.082) (see Table 9).
Table 8
Aggregated relative importance (sample and rational benchmark).
Rational Sample
Tax rate 0.4615 0.5600
Deduction of income-related expenses 0.5385 0.4400
Table 9
Impact of repeated execution.
Decision in favor of tax system with lowest tax burden (in%)
Yes No
Before ﬁrst feedback 32.1 67.9
After ﬁrst feedback 44.6 55.4
Above the percentages of tax burden minimizing decisions are displayed for the ﬁrst choice and the fol-
lowing choices in the experiment. The complete overview of the experimental results is given in Table 12
(Appendix B).
21 We compared only the ﬁrst with the last decision, too, but the results remain the same.
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To test for determinants of learning effects, we use a generalized estimation equation. The parameter estimations and
robust standard errors are shown in Table 10. We choose this technique because we are interested in estimation of popu-
lation average impact. A logistic link function is formulated for the dependent variable ‘‘lowest tax burden (yes/no)’’. As
explanatory variables period, age, education and tax knowledge (self-assessment) are used.22 While we ﬁnd the demographic
variables not to have any impact on the ranking, period has a weak signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence (p = 0.084). The likelihood to
choose the tax option with the lowest tax burden is 70% higher in the third period compared to the ﬁrst one.
Hence, the implementation of a learning environment leads to a slight enhancement of the conjoint analysis results. However,
even after learning the majority of subjects do not make a rational choice. Most subjects still overrate the nominal tax rate.
5. Discussion
If individuals behave rationally according to traditional economic theory, it makes no difference whether their tax rate or
(by equal measure) their tax deductions change. By contrast, if one takes into account the idea that individuals tend to avoid
cognitive strain and instead use simpliﬁed decision heuristics changes in the tax rate may inﬂuence the perceived tax burden
more strongly than do changes in the tax base.
To empirically test the hypothesis regarding the use of heuristics, the resulting overestimation of the importance of
changes in tax rates, and the framing effect, we conduct both a conjoint analysis and a lab experiment. In line with behavioral
studies incorporating the burden of cognitive strain, our results reveal that the majority of the subjects use decision heuris-
tics. The use of heuristics leads to a noticeable overestimation of the relative importance of changes in tax rates and to an
underestimation of the importance of changes in the tax base. We show that the overestimation increases considerably
when information about the tax rate is mentioned ﬁrst (framing effect).
Even after the introduction of performance based incentives we observe that subjects still overestimate nominal tax rate
changes. However, we ﬁnd slight evidence for learning effects. After the implementation of a learning environment, the use
of heuristics decreases weak signiﬁcantly, but even after learning the majority of subjects do not make a rational choice.
Most subjects still overrate the importance of the nominal tax rate.
Our results indicate that politicians could simultaneously increase tax revenues and reduce the perceived tax burden for tax-
payers. Taxpayers favor tax options that apply a lower tax rate on their gross income over a higher tax rate applied on their net
income despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. This result remains stable in a lab experiment where perfor-
mance-based incentives and a learning environment are established. Consistent with the identiﬁed framing effect, emphasizing
the nominal tax rate when presenting tax options can reduce the perceived tax burden solely through the display format.
Our study offers starting points for future research. First, the present study only considers the effect of non-speciﬁed in-
come-related expenses. It would be interesting to analyze whether subjects also underestimate the importance of changes in
the deductibility of emotionally loaded costs like commuting expenses. Second, we study the behavior of the German work-
ing population not the behavior of tax experts. Thus, it would be worth to explore if our results also hold for specialized deci-
sion makers in companies. Third, we do not vary complexity. According to current research (e.g., Blaufus & Ortlieb, 2009),
subject’s performance decreases with increasing complexity. Fourth, we abstract from distribution and equity effects that
are usually affected by introducing new tax options. Finally, even though considering changes in tax rate and tax base simul-
taneously is speciﬁc to taxes, it would be interesting to see, whether our results regarding overestimation are of relevance for
non-tax frames, too. For example, our results could be relevant for consumer price research. According to our results the va-
lue of a relative price discount should be perceived as higher when it is applied at a higher discount rate on a narrow base
(e.g. product price excluding extras) compared to a lower discount rate on a broad base (e.g. product price including extras).
Table 10
GEE results: determinants of learning effects.
Coefﬁcient Std. error
Period 0.533* 0.309
Education 0.103 0.476
Tax return self-prepared 0.116 0.461
Age 0.760 0.481
Constant 0.197 0.420
Dependent variable: rational ranking.
* indicates signiﬁcance on the 10% level, standard errors are robust.
22 One might ask why sex is not used as explanatory variable. Out of the 56 subjects that take part in the experiment only 6 are male. Because of this
enormous mismatch sex was excluded of the analysis.
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Table 11
Distribution of quota attributes in sample.
Attribute Value Frequency Percent Percent (Population)
Gender Male 209 44.8 45.2
Female 258 55.2 54.8
Age Under 20 15 3.2 3.5
20–29 96 20.6 17.5
30–39 112 24.0 24.0
40–49 125 26.8 29.6
50–59 94 20.1 20.5
60 and older 25 5.4 5.1
Education University degree 81 17.3 16.0
University-entrance qualiﬁcation 80 17.1 14.5
Secondary school leaving certiﬁcate 126 27.0 26.8
Lower secondary school leaving certiﬁcate 136 29.1 31.4
No school leaving certiﬁcate 8 1.7 2.2
Other 36 7.7 9.1
Monthly net Income Under € 1000 161 34.5 32.7
€ 1000–2000 206 44.1 44.8
€ 2000–3000 65 13.9 14.6
Above € 3000 30 6.4 8.0
Not stated 5 1.1 –
Table 12
Distribution of choices in the experiment (in%).
Tax rate
25% 30% 35%
Deductible expenses
100% – 32.1 (44.6,44.6) 7.1 (3.6,1.8)
33% 25.0 (25.0,26.8) 5.4 (1.8,7.1) 1.8 (3.6,3.6)
0% 26.8 (19.6,8.9) 1.8 (1.8,5.4) 0.0 (0.0,1.8)
Percentage of choices that the respective tax system received in the ﬁrst (second, third) period. The
tax system with the lowest tax burden (tax rate 25%, deductible expenses 100%, top left) was given.
From top to bottom and from left to right tax burdens decrease. The worst tax system is at bottom
right (tax rate 35%, deductible expenses 0%).
Fig. 2. Screenshot from the experiment – working task.
Appendix B
Appendix A
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Appendix C
C.1. Experimental instructions, part 1 (presented before the working task)
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in this experiment (see Figs. 3 and 4).
By these instructions the procedure of the experiment will be explained. Please read the instructions carefully. Take as
much time as you need to read and understand them.
The experiment consists of three periods. To make you familiar with the software and your task, there will be a trial per-
iod that has no impact on the outcome of the experiment. Please take sufﬁcient time to grasp the information presented on
the screen. The trial period lasts 5 min.
Fig. 3. Screenshot from the experiment – choosing individual tax system.
Fig. 4. Screenshot from the experiment – feedback.
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Every new period won’t be started until all participants are ready. This can lead to short waiting times. In the meantime
you are presented with current headlines.
During the entire experiment laboratory-Euros are used as currency unit. The exchange rate of laboratory-Euros to actual
Euros is explained in detail later.
Your task is to convert three-digit numbers into two letters. Every number-letter combination is given in a list. For exam-
ple ‘‘356: CF’’.
After entering two letters and a subsequent click on the ‘‘check’’ button, the program compares your input with the data
given in the list. Correct inputs are then shown in the table ‘‘correct inputs’’, while incorrectly entered letters are shown in
the table ‘‘incorrect inputs’’. Please use only upper case letters.
For every correct input, you are credited with 400 laboratory-Euros. In every period you can reach up to 25 correct inputs,
i.e. you can earn up to 10000 laboratory-Euros. To reach the maximum of 25 correct entries, you get at most 10 min of time. If
you reach the maximum number of correct entries before time elapses, the task ends automatically. Otherwise it ends after
10 min.
Costs arise while you use the software. The amount of these costs depends on how long you need to complete the working
task. Within the ﬁrst ﬁve minutes, you are charged with a ﬁxed amount of 3000 laboratory-Euros. If you need longer than
ﬁve minutes, you are charged with an additional 100 laboratory-Euros for every additionally 30 s.
The remaining time (in seconds) is shown at the top right corner on the screen.
Your income is subject to an income tax (earnings–costs). You will have to choose one out of eight tax systems that differ,
exclusively, in the nominal tax rate (25%, 30%, 35%) and the amount of tax deductible expenses (full deduction allowed, par-
tial deduction allowed, no deduction allowed). You choose your tax system by your own. Your decision does not affect the
taxation of the other participants.
Your payment in the experiment depends on your net income:
Earnings–Costs–Taxes (in laboratory-Euros)
At the end of each period, your actual payment (in Cent) is displayed. For every 100 laboratory-Euros that exceed the
threshold of 4500 laboratory-Euros, you receive a payoff of 200 Cents. If your net income does not exceed the threshold
by at least 100 laboratory-Euros, you will receive the minimum payment of 200 Cents.
If you have any questions regarding the course of the experiment, please do not hesitate to contact the experimental
supervisor.
By clicking the ‘‘Continue’’ button, you proceed to the ﬁrst stage of the experiment. It will start as soon as all participants
are ready.
C.2. Experimental instructions, part 2 (presented after the working tax)
Your income is subject to an income tax. Therefore, you have to choose one out of eight taxation options. You choose your
tax system by your own. Your decision does not affect the taxation of the other participants. Your decision is in effect only for
the current period. You may choose other tax systems at the end of the following periods. The eight taxation options differ in
two ways.
First, the various options differ in the nominal tax rate at which your income is taxed.
Second, a distinction is made on the amount of deduction allowance. If the deduction allowed equals zero, you have to
pay taxes on your earnings without deducting any expenses, i.e. on 10,000 laboratory-Euros. If deduction allowance is
not limited, you just have to pay taxes on your earnings less your actual costs, i.e. on 10000 laboratory-Euros  3000 labo-
ratory-Euros = 7000 laboratory-Euros. If deduction allowance is limited to one third of your actual costs, you have to tax your
income less the one third of your actual costs, i.e. on 10000 laboratory-Euros  1000 laboratory-Euros = 9000 laboratory-
Euros.
A calculator is available if needed.
An example of a possible taxation option is given below. The tax rate equals 25%, deductions are allowed up to 3000 lab-
oratory-Euros. Hence, you have to pay taxes in the amount of 1750 laboratory-Euros.
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Abstract In this paper, a tax game with audit costs as a public bad is designed to
investigate the impact of public disclosure on tax evasion experimentally. Three different
types of tax privacy are tested, ranging from complete privacy to full disclosure. We expect
to observe two different effects: first, a contagion effect, arising when an individual observes
non-compliance of other individuals and therefore reduces his own tax compliance; second, a
shame effect of increased tax compliance due to the anticipated shame of being declared a tax
evader. We find evidence of increasing tax evasion with reduced tax privacy if information is
disclosed anonymously. Our results also indicate that the shame effect is not strong enough
to override the contagion effect when both effects are present. Our results are of particular
importance for fiscal policy because public disclosure may lead to more evasion instead of
less, due to motivational crowding-out of tax morale.
Keywords Tax privacy · Tax evasion · Public bad · Social Norm · Conditional
cooperation · Economic experiment
JEL classification H23 · H24 · H26 · H30
1 Introduction
Death is certain, but paying taxes is definitely not—at least, not for everyone. According
to the Internal Revenue Service, the tax gap in the United States amounts to $385 billion
for tax year 2006 alone, mainly due to underreported income. Non-compliance reduces both
public revenue and the availability of public services and also discriminates against honest
taxpayers (Alm, 2012). Therefore, fighting tax evasion is an important issue for policy
agendas. A number of countries (e.g., Greece and New Zealand) publicly list tax evaders
to combat tax evasion. Others (e.g., Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) disclose all tax
return information. However, the majority of countries treat tax information confidentially.
The main reason to disclose tax compliance information publicly is to deter people from
evading taxes by threatening them with the shame of being announced as tax evaders.
In addition to the imposition of monetary penalties, shame should be effective as a non-
monetary sanction. However, it is far from obvious that a strategy of tax publicity is a
successful instrument for fighting tax evasion. Previous research has demonstrated that
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social norms have a considerable impact on tax evasion (Cullis et al., 2012). Individuals
comply as long as they believe that compliance is the social norm (Alm, 2012). Gino et al.
(2009) show that the observation of unethical behavior of another person is potentially
contagious because it may change the social norms regarding dishonesty. Therefore, at the
same time that publishing information could be a deterrent to tax evasion (via the shame
effect), it could also destroy the social norm of compliance. This effect would be in keeping
with a strand of literature that shows that taxpayers are conditionally cooperative, i.e.,
people are willing to comply as long as others do (e.g., Frey and Torgler, 2007; Traxler,
2010). Due to these potentially opposing effects—increasing shame on the one hand, risk
of contagion on the other—the overall effect of public disclosure on tax compliance remains
unclear.
Our study investigates different levels of publicized tax evasion to determine whether the
shame effect or the contagion effect dominates as an overall behavioral response. Using a lab
experiment enables a controlled variation of tax privacy as a treatment variable. We design
a specific tax game with a baseline treatment of no public disclosure. In one treatment,
individual tax information is disclosed publicly in an anonymous manner; therefore, only the
contagion effect may arise. In another treatment, public disclosure occurs by displaying the
pictures of the players next to their tax information, introducing both shame and contagion
effects.
Overall, we find evidence of increasing tax evasion with reduced tax privacy if information
is disclosed anonymously. In the case of full public disclosure, i.e., when both the contagion
and shame effects are present, shame is not strong enough to override contagion. The policy
implications are clear: universal tax return publicity should not be implemented because
more evasion could result due to motivational crowding-out of tax morale.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a brief literature
review with its implications for our study. In section 3, the tax game and the experimental
design of the study are described. The results are provided and discussed in section 4, and
section 5 concludes.
2 Tax evasion theory
The theory of tax evasion is primarily based on the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
which assumes that each individual maximizes expected utility after taxes, applying a certain
audit probability and penalty level. However, it has been shown that actual tax compliance
often differs from the predictions of this model (e.g., Dhami and Al-Nowaihi, 2007), and the
model has therefore been modified in several aspects. With respect to tax publicity, the
following two modifications seem particularly important. First, Erard and Feinstein (1994)
account for moral sentiments (such as shame) and empirically show that sentiments can
be important determinants of compliance. In their model, individuals experience utility-
reducing shame when they evade taxes and are subsequently audited. Shame reduces the
benefits of evasion and decreases its occurrence. If tax publicity increases shame, disclosure
could help to reduce evasion. Second, Traxler (2010) incorporates tax morale, as internalized
social norm of tax compliance, into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) standard model.
Taxpayers are assumed to conditionally cooperate because their level of evasion depends on
others’ compliance. The results imply that strategies that increase belief in high compliance
levels reduce tax evasion. Consequently, publishing information about actual tax evasion
could alter this belief in a high compliance level and thus destroy the corresponding social
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norm. This effect would conform to the observation of the contagion effect of unethical
behavior in Gino et al. (2009) or the widely discussed broken window hypothesis (Wilson
and Kelling, 1982).
Hence, tax publicity might trigger two opposing effects simultaneously—the shame effect
and the contagion effect. The sum of the overall effect of tax publicity is theoretically unclear;
therefore, its positive or negative impact is a matter for empirical investigation. Despite its
great policy importance, direct evidence on the effects of tax privacy is scarce. To our
knowledge, there exists neither a theoretical study that incorporates both these effects nor
an empirical study of public tax disclosure that simultaneously evaluates the contagion and
shame effects on tax compliance. However, there are two experimental and two empirical
studies on the effects of tax publicity.
Laury and Wallace (2005) investigate the impact of tax confidentiality experimentally
in a between-subjects design. Individuals decide how much of a given income to report
to the tax authority under two different treatments. Subjects are informed about the tax
rate, the (exogenous) audit probability, and the relevant fine. In the first treatment, full
confidentiality is employed. In the second treatment, only partial confidentiality is used,
and 25% of the subjects’ decisions are disclosed to all other participants. However, the
decisions are anonymous and cannot be tracked to the actual person making the decision.
The results show that reported income is typically higher under the partial confidentiality
treatment; however, this difference is significant only in five out of twenty periods. Moreover,
when controlling for demographic variables (particularly gender, marital status, student of
economics, raised in North America) the treatment effect becomes insignificant. By and
large, the results of this study are ambiguous.
Coricelli et al. (2010) use a within-subjects design to study the impact of tax publicity
on compliance. Subjects, in groups of eight players, decide individually how much income
to declare. The declared income is subject to a uniform tax rate. Again, taxpayers are
informed about audit probability and fines. The treatment variable is the publication of
individual pictures. In half of the trials, if an audit reveals that a player underreported his
income, a picture of the detected evader is displayed on the group members’ screens. The
results show that tax publicity reduces both the number of evaders and the amount of tax
evaded. The risk of being “named and shamed” as an evader diminishes the probability that
an individual will evade taxes by 8.2%.
In addition to these experimental studies, two archival studies were recently published.
Hasegawa et al. (2012) use Japanese data where disclosure of both individual and corporate
income tax information was mandatory from 1950 until 2004. These data show no evidence
that companies reduced declared taxable income after the disclosure requirement was abol-
ished in 2004. However, companies prefer to avoid public disclosure and therefore decreased
reported taxable income to be below the threshold beyond which disclosure is required. In
contrast to Hasegawa et al. (2012), Slemrod et al. (2013) report evidence that public disclo-
sure of tax returns on the Internet increases reported income. These authors’ estimate of
the effect of public disclosure on tax compliance based on a quasi-experimental study using
data from Norwegian income tax statistics is an increase in reported income of 3%.
Overall, evidence on the effect of tax publicity is rare and the data available are ambiguous.
While Laury and Wallace (2005) find only a weak effect from tax publicity and Hasegawa
et al. (2012) find no effect from tax publicity, the results of Slemrod et al. (2013) and
Coricelli et al. (2010) indicate that abolishing tax privacy laws could increase tax compliance.
Moreover, the consequences of different sorts of tax publicity are unclear. For example, the
weak results of Laury and Wallace (2005) could be due to the anonymous form in which tax
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return information is announced in these studies. There, it can be expected that anticipated
shame is no deterrent because participants remain anonymous. If, however, a person can
be identified by the other participants—e.g., by displaying photos of the subject as in the
experiment by Coricelli et al. (2010)—shame should be exacerbated. This might explain
why, in contrast to Laury and Wallace (2005), Coricelli et al. (2010) find a strong positive
effect of disclosure on compliance.
Interestingly, neither of the experimental studies on tax compliance behavior implements
a public good or any refund of taxes. This neglects the fact that public good games provide
a standardized opportunity for studying social interactions within groups (Frey and Torgler,
2007). Outside of such a public good context, externalities may not arise; hence, there is no
need for social norms (Huck et al., 2012). This possibility raises the question of whether these
experiments underestimate the contagion effect. Conditional cooperators do contribute as
long as others contribute, but without a public good context, there is neither necessity nor
an opportunity to cooperate. Without a direct public good context, it is unclear whether
participants perceive their payment of taxes as contributions to a public good or simply
as a cost. If one’s own income is not affected by the decisions of other group members,
rules of reciprocity or conformity may seem less important. Therefore, the contagion effect
loses its bite. To answer this question, we conduct a tax experiment that is designed to
investigate the responses to different levels of tax publicity in a public good context, which
also allow us to draw conclusions about whether a shame or contagion effect dominates
overall contributions.
3 Experimental design
We adapt a standard public good game with repetition, inverting the public good by in-
troducing audit costs as a public bad. The rationale behind this is that evasion requires
the state to implement a costly tax audit administration that must be equally shared by all
subjects. The costs of this administration reduce the endowment of each individual upfront,
where each of the N subjects bears 1/N of the costs. In a world without evasion, there
would be no need for tax audits. Thus, by complying with the tax law, subjects reduce
the costs of tax audits, i.e., they reduce the public bad. However, if some subjects do not
contribute their share of taxes, the state will need to increase the audit probability. That,
in turn, increases the public bad. This idea is implemented in the following way:
A group of six players receives an aggregate endowment of 450 cents income in each round
(each individual receives 75 cents).1 Given a nominal tax rate of 30%, the group in total
must pay income taxes of 135 cents (450 × 0.3) in each round. All taxes paid are removed
from the game (there is no refund or compensation) and only tax evasion determines the
public bad in the form of changing audit costs. In the case of equal contribution, every
member of the group would have to pay 22.5 cents, but subjects can decide individually how
much tax they wish to pay. Hence, subjects are given the chance to evade taxes, where the
individual evasion is given by
Ei,t = max [22.5− τi,t; 0] (1)
with τi,t being the tax paid by subject i in round t, and Ei,t being the resulting evasion.
1Cent is the experimental currency and for every cent subjects earn they receive a euro-cent as payoff.
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Total evasion determines the cost incurred in the next round. Hence, the cost of audit
administration is equal to the sum of taxes evaded by all subjects of one group in the previous
round given by
Ct =
6∑
i=1
Ei,t−1 (2)
with Ct being the cost of round t, and Ei,t−1 being the evasion of individual i in round t−1.
This cost may be perceived as damage done that must be borne equally by all subjects. As
long as there is no individual tax evasion, the cost of audit administration remains zero.
Therefore, by paying taxes, subjects reduce the implemented public bad. If some subjects
choose to ride completely free or not fully contribute their sixth of the demanded tax, the
cost of audit administration increases. Because cost must not be negative, i.e., Ct ≥ 0, the
overpayment of taxes is not refunded. Audits to combat tax evasion occur with a given
probability that is dependent on the tax evasion present in the previous round. Thus, audit
probability is endogenous and defined by
pt = 0.005× Ct (3)
with pt being the audit probability of round t, and Ct being the cost from (2). This restricts
the audit probability to the interval 0 to 67.5%. An overview of these relations between
taxes paid, cost, and audit probability is provided in Table 3 of Appendix A.
Audits occur at the individual level based on the probability given in (3). After every
round, it is determined whether declared taxes are sufficient for each subject. If an audit
occurs and tax evasion is detected (i.e., if Ei,t > 0), the subject has to pay immediately the
amount Ei,t plus a penalty of 50% of Ei,t. Hence,
θi,t =
{
1.5× Ei,t if an audit occurs,
0 otherwise
(4)
with θi,t being the sanction for subject i in round t. Note also that we follow the recom-
mendation of Alm (2010) and describe the game in neutral language to avoid subjects using
individual scripts when interpreting loaded terms (i.e., instead of the term “tax”, the term
“fee” is used).
In each period, subjects’ experimental income is equal to the original endowment of 75
cents less taxes, costs, and sanctions. The overall income equals the sum of the 20-period
earnings and the payoff from the experiment is given by
pii =
20∑
t=1
75− 22.5 + Ei,t − Ct
6
− θi,t. (5)
In a between-subjects design, we implement three treatments that differ in their degree of
tax privacy. In our baseline treatment (no information treatment), subjects are only aware
of the group’s overall tax gap, but have no information on individual tax evasion. This
setting reflects tax privacy as it is in most countries. The degree of tax evasion is (at least
roughly) known, but individual misconduct is not. In the second and third treatments, there
is no tax privacy: all subjects are directly informed about the individual behavior of their
group members after each round—everyone knows who evades taxes and to what extent.
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The difference between treatments two and three is the type of publication. In the second
treatment (partial information treatment), only subject numbers are stated, but numbers
and individuals cannot be matched. This treatment corresponds to the partial confidentiality
treatment in Laury and Wallace (2005). Moreover, because desks are individually separated,
other subjects and their screens are not visible. Feelings of shame should not arise under the
anonymous disclosure used in this treatment. However, because subjects are provided with
information regarding the individual behavior of the other subjects, a contagion effect could
result. In the third treatment (full information treatment), photos of subjects are paired
with each subject’s tax behavior.2 This treatment is equivalent to the picture treatment in
Coricelli et al. (2010). Due to individual disclosure, both shame and contagion effects can
be expected. By comparing both the partial and the full information treatments, we can
identify whether the shame or contagion effect predominates when ceding tax privacy.
The experimental procedure is as follows: After entering the laboratory, subjects are
randomly assigned to their group.3 The subjects remain in the same group and are provided
the same treatment throughout the whole experiment. Subjects are given instructions (see
Appendix A) after being seated and as much time as they require to fully understand the
procedure. Only after all subjects confirm that they fully understand the experimental
instructions and do not have any remaining questions does the tax game begin.
Each experimental session consists of 20 rounds. Screenshots of the different stages of
the experiment are provided in Appendix C. At the beginning of each round, subjects are
informed about the taxes evaded in the previous round and about the resulting consequences,
i.e., the group’s total cost according to (2) and the current audit probability according to
(3).4
Then, subjects are informed about their endowment (75 cents), their share of the group’s
total costs, their endowment after costs are deducted, the required amount of taxes (22.5
cents), and the current audit probability. At this point, subjects must decide (without time
restrictions) how much in taxes they wish to contribute.
After deciding their contribution, subjects are informed of the group’s total result. Sub-
jects are also informed whether their contributions are subject to an audit5 and, if applicable,
on the amount of penalties they must pay.
At the end of each round, subjects are informed about their results from the current round
as well as their total income so far.
When all 20 rounds are completed, subjects must answer a short questionnaire that seeks
information regarding demographic variables including age, gender, and area of expertise.
Then, individual risk aversion is measured using lottery decisions based on the procedure of
Holt and Laury (2002). An extract of the full questionnaire is given in Appendix B.
A total of 198 undergraduate and graduate students participated in the computer-based
experiments, programmed and conducted under z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment
2These pictures were taken before the experiment inside the laboratory. After the experiment was finished,
all photos were deleted in the presence of the participants.
320 sessions were conducted with 13 sessions made up of 2 groups and another 7 sessions made up of
one group. In 10 of the 13 sessions with 2 groups, subjects were assigned to either the no information
treatment or the partial information treatment, while in the other 3 sessions all subjects were assigned
to the same treatment. In 5 of the 7 sessions with only one group, individuals were assigned to the full
information treatment, while in the other sessions they were all assigned to the no information treatment.
4Since there was no round 0, costs and audit probability for round 0 were given exogenously with C1 = 80
and p1 = 0.40.
5A uniformly distributed random number between 0 and 1 was drawn. If this number did not exceed the
current audit probability, an audit occurred.
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Tax evasion (in %)
No information
Partial information
Full information
36.8 41.7 38.6
Figure 1: Average tax evasion in the three treatments
took place in the ViaLab of the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder). Subjects
earned an average of e 9.99 (std. dev. e 1.05). They were on average 22 years old and 85%
were German. The majority of the subjects (2/3) were economics students.
4 Results
The overall result is an increase of non-compliance in the absence of tax privacy if information
is disclosed anonymously. Our results from the partial information treatment indicate that
this result is due to the contagion effect. The results from the full information treatment
show that shame does not weaken this effect significantly. Tax evasion is not lower in the
full information treatment than in the baseline treatment, suggesting that the shame effect
is not strong enough to override the contagion effect when both effects are present.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Tax evasion is higher in the absence of tax privacy, as shown in Figure 1. In the no informa-
tion treatment, the average tax evasion is 8.28 cents (37% of the required taxes), whereas tax
evasion amounts to 9.38 cents (42%) in the partial information treatment. This difference
in average tax evasion is highly significant (two-sample t-test, p < 0.01).6 Observing non-
compliance causes conditionally cooperative taxpayers to reduce their contributions, and
thus the contagion effect is positive. Tax evasion is higher when information on other sub-
jects does not contain personal information. In the full information treatment, tax evasion
amounts to 8.69 cents (39%). The difference stemming from the shame effect is not signifi-
cant in comparison to the evasion observed in the partial information treatment (two-sample
t-test, p = 0.15), and the shame effect compensates for the contagion effect as tax evasion
6We tested for difference in tax evasion between all three treatments and, hence, performed multiple testing.
All p-values are adjusted according to Holm (1979).
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No Partial Full
information information information
Tax evasion (in %) 36.78 (41.40) 41.66 (44.15) 38.61 (41.73)
Audit Probability 0.23 (0.20) 0.25 (0.21) 0.25 (0.21)
Audit Frequency 0.25 0.25 0.26
Penaltiy (in cent) 18.77 (12.38) 19.92 (12.95) 19.18 (11.74)
Final profit (in e ) 9.94 (1.06) 10.03 (1.24) 9.99 (0.72)
Females (in %) 62.5 52.8 57.4
Age (in years) 22.26 (2.59) 22.17 (2.33) 22.07 (2.33)
Economic students (in %) 63.9 70.8 70.4
Risk aversion 5.26 (2.63) 5.38 (1.83) 5.02 (2.31)
Subjects 72 72 54
Values shown above are means with standard deviations in parentheses of cents per period. Audit
frequency is simply the overall percentage of audits that occurred. Subjects’ final profit is their
total experimental income accumulated over 20 rounds. Risk aversion was measured based upon
Holt and Laury (2002). Subjects were given 10 paired lottery-choice decisions. Risk aversion is the
average number of decisions subjects made in favor of the risk free alternative. A more detailed
overview on the measure of risk aversion, as well as the other variables, is given in Appendix B.
The subjects row simply shows the number of subjects per treatment.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
in the full information treatment is not significantly higher than in the baseline treatment
(p = 0.29).7
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. Audit probability and penalty are calculated
from tax evasion as illustrated in Table 3 of Appendix A.
Audit probability is a linear function of tax evasion (3) and, on average, is higher in
both the partial and the full information treatment (25% each) than in the no information
treatment (23%). The frequency of audits is very similar in all three treatments (25% in the
no and partial information treatments and 26% in the full information treatment).
Even though tax evasion is the highest in the partial information treatment, penalties
are the lowest, indicating that subjects in the partial information treatment use low audit
probabilities to fully evade taxes. Accordingly, final profit is slightly higher in the partial
information treatment than in the other two treatments, but this difference is not significant
(analysis of variances, p = 0.17). Overall, subjects earned on average e 9.99. Subjects could
easily raise average incomes by full compliance.8
7Separating the contagion effect from the shame effect is not possible in this experimental design because
the shame component always also leads to contagion.
8Note that subjects had to bear total costs in the amount of C1 = 80 in the first round (see section 3) and
under full compliance their maximum profit in the first round would be 75−80/6−22.5 = 39.2. In all other
rounds the maximum profit under full compliance is 75−22.5 = 52.5. Hence, pii = 39.2+1952.5 = 1036.7
and their incomes would increases by on average 37.8, which is about 4% of their actual mean income.
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Robust
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
Intercept 9.13 0.77 <0.01 ***
Partial information treatment 1.36 0.38 <0.01 ***
Full information treatment 0.94 1.50 0.53
Audit probability -25.45 1.19 <0.01 ***
Female -1.83 0.49 <0.01 ***
Student of economics 1.39 0.54 0.01 **
Risk aversion -0.45 0.17 <0.01 ***
Income 0.01 0.00 <0.01 ***
Dependent variable: tax evasion, 3960 observations, adj. R2 = 0.29
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Standard errors are clustered at the group level
Table 2: Random effects model (OLS)
4.2 Panel analysis
What influences tax evasion behavior? As noted in section 3, a total of 198 students par-
ticipated in experimental sessions comprising 20 rounds each, resulting in 198 × 20 = 3960
observations. We apply a one-way random effects panel model on these data. This panel
model offers a major advantage: it enables us to include unobserved heterogeneity among
individuals in our model, implicitly assuming that there are differences in behavior across
subjects. We choose random, instead of fixed, effects because fixed effects only allow consid-
eration of varying regressors. In our design, only audit probability and income vary between
subjects. Because we are not only interested in audit probability but also in the impact
of tax privacy and other determinants on tax evasion, we must use random effects. Our
one-way random effects model is given by
Ei,t = µ+ αi + γjTj +
∑
i
δXi,t + εi,t (6)
with Ei,t as the tax evasion of subject i in round t, µ being the average tax evasion and αi
being the individual specific effect. Tj are the dummy variables for both the partial and the
full information treatment, and the matrix Xit contains the covariates with gender, subject
of study, risk aversion, and income. The no information treatment (full anonymity) is the
baseline treatment. In the partial information treatment, public disclosure is anonymous; in
the full information treatment, real public disclosure occurs. Subjects’ total profit accumu-
lated at the beginning of each round is their income. The other model variables are briefly
described in section 4.1, and the results are given in Table 2.
The descriptive results are further confirmed by the panel regression: tax evasion increases
with decreasing tax privacy. The coefficients of both the partial and the full information
treatments are both positive, but only the coefficient of the partial information treatment is
significant. Because disclosure is anonymous in the partial information treatment, the strong
effect of this treatment can only stem from the simple observation of others’ behavior, i.e.,
a contagion effect. As in our descriptive results, the difference in tax evasion between the
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baseline and the full information treatments is not significant, indicating that shame is not
strong enough to override the contagion effect. This is further supported by the fact that
the difference between the two information treatment coefficients is not significant.9
The impact of control variables is as expected from the previous literature. Audit prob-
ability has a highly significant negative impact on tax evasion. Male subjects evade more
taxes than female subjects, which comports with Kastlunger et al. (2010), and economics
students are less compliant than others, as has been shown before by Cullis et al. (2012).
Tax evasion increases with decreasing risk aversion and risk aversion decreases with higher
income—together, these effects lead to more tax evasion at higher incomes. These patterns
prevail even if the public resource is crowded out, and all must share the burden of the
public bad.
5 Conclusion
To determine the effect of tax privacy on tax compliance, we designed a tax game with
tax privacy as the treatment variable. Tax privacy ranged from full confidentiality to full
publicity, combining the different forms of tax publicity from Laury and Wallace (2005) and
Coricelli et al. (2010). Theoretically, two opposing effects—a contagion effect and a shame
effect—can occur in response to public disclosure. We investigated these effects at three
different levels of tax privacy.
In the partial information treatment, tax information is publicly disclosed in an anony-
mous manner. The only difference from the baseline treatment of full tax privacy is that the
behavior of the other subjects in one’s group is observable. Because subjects remain anony-
mous in this treatment, the shame effect is not expected, and the only impact on compliance
results from the contagion effect. In contrast, in the full information treatment, public dis-
closure of all individuals is employed: tax evaders’ photos are shown, which presents the
potential for the shame effect. The shame effect only arises if subjects’ contributions are
known and linked to each subject. Overall, we find higher tax evasion with public disclosure
if information is published anonymously. This indicates that the pure observation of deviant
behavior could destroy the social norm of compliance and lead to one’s own non-compliance.
Additionally, the shame effect appears to be too small to override the contagion effect when
both are present simultaneously. This is of particular importance to fiscal policy: general
public disclosure could lead to more, instead of less, evasion, especially if information is
published anonymously.
These results should be interpreted with caution. While Alm et al. (1992) do not find
any impact from terminology used (loaded vs. neutral) on tax compliance, other studies
provide some evidence that subjects are more compliant in a tax, as opposed to a neutral,
context (Baldry, 1986; Wartick et al., 1999; Durham et al., 2012). This could potentially
influence the relative strength of the different effects. The shame effect could also be more
effective in natural settings where long-term economic consequences often result. However,
the work of Coricelli et al. (2010) indicates that accounting for emotions in the laboratory is
possible and that emotion is the main driver of the shame effect. There is no direct reason
why emotion should not be present in the laboratory, but stronger financial consequences
might increase the importance of fear in the tax evasion decision. The broader question
here concerns the impact an initiative might have on social behavior where the motivational
9The difference of the coefficients is 1.36 − 0.94 = 0.42 and the corresponding standard error amounts to
1.12, which leads to p = 0.71.
29
crowding literature (i.e., Benabou and Tirole, 2006 or Bolle and Otto, 2010) stresses the
importance of the current state for predicting potential changes.
In contrast to Laury and Wallace (2005) and Coricelli et al. (2010), tax publicity leads
to higher tax evasion in our study (at least) in the case of anonymous disclosure. This
strong difference might be due to the missing public good context in the previous studies,
which leads to an underestimation of the contagion effect. Outside a public good context,
there exists neither a necessity nor an opportunity to cooperate. Within this standard of
cooperative behavior, the effects of tax publicity remain ambiguous with no sustained effect
of copying positive behavior, as can be observed, for instance, in a fundraising context
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). In addition to the negative impact of shame on tax evasion,
there is an opposing contagion effect that might, overall, lead to less compliance.
A Experimental instructions
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment on the evaluation of group be-
havior. Overall, the experiment will last about one hour. Your payoff depends both on your
own decisions and on the decisions of the other players. In the following, we will give you a
short overview on how the experiment is carried out. If you have any questions, please do
not hesitate to contact the experimental supervisor.
1. Initially, you are randomly assigned to one out of two groups. Both groups are made
up of six players each. Throughout the whole experiment, the groups’ composition
remains unchanged.
2. There will be a total of 20 rounds. At the beginning of each round, every group
member receives an endowment of 75 cents. Thus, the group’s total endowment is 450
cents for every round.
3. In each of the 20 rounds, you must pay fees on your endowment. You may decide
on the amount of your fees yourself. However, in each round your group’s total fees
should sum up to 135 cents. In the case of a uniform distribution, every member of
your group would have to pay 22.5 cents.
4. If your group’s total fees amount to less than 135 cents, the consequences for the
following round are twofold. First, there will be a cost for your group in the amount
of the underpaid fee. Secondly, the amount of the underpaid fee will determine the
probability of your individual fee being audited in the next round. If you are audited,
and it is found that you paid less than the required 22.5 cents, your underpaid fee plus
a penalty of half of your less underpaid fees will be collected automatically.
5. The consequences resulting from underpaid fees by your group are given in Table 3.
The table reads as follows: There will not be any cost in the next round, if you and
your group members paid at least the required fee of 135 cents in total. Moreover, your
individual fee in the following round will not be subject to an audit. For instance, there
will be a cost of 6 cents in the following round if the group’s total fees only sum up to
129 cents. These costs will be split equally among every group member. Thus, in the
next round, there will be a deduction of 1 cent from the endowment of every member
of your group. The corresponding audit probability for the next round amounts to
3%.
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135 0 0.0 101 34 17.0 67 68 34.0 33 102 51.0
134 1 0.5 100 35 17.5 66 69 34.5 32 103 51.5
133 2 1.0 99 36 18.0 65 70 35.0 31 104 52.0
132 3 1.5 98 37 18.5 64 71 35.5 30 105 52.5
131 4 2.0 97 38 19.0 63 72 36.0 29 106 53.0
130 5 2.5 96 39 19.5 62 73 36.5 28 107 53.5
129 6 3.0 95 40 20.0 61 74 37.0 27 108 54.0
128 7 3.5 94 41 20.5 60 75 37.5 26 109 54.5
127 8 4.0 93 42 21.0 59 76 38.0 25 110 55.0
126 9 4.5 92 43 21.5 58 77 38.5 24 111 55.5
125 10 5.0 91 44 22.0 57 78 39.0 23 112 56.0
124 11 5.5 90 45 22.5 56 79 39.5 22 113 56.5
123 12 6.0 89 46 23.0 55 80 40.0 21 114 57.0
122 13 6.5 88 47 23.5 54 81 40.5 20 115 57.5
121 14 7.0 87 48 24.0 53 82 41.0 19 116 58.0
120 15 7.5 86 49 24.5 52 83 41.5 18 117 58.5
119 16 8.0 85 50 25.0 51 84 42.0 17 118 59.0
118 17 8.5 84 51 25.5 50 85 42.5 16 119 59.5
117 18 9.0 83 52 26.0 49 86 43.0 15 120 60.0
116 19 9.5 82 53 26.5 48 87 43.5 14 121 60.5
115 20 10.0 81 54 27.0 47 88 44.0 13 122 61.0
114 21 10.5 80 55 27.5 46 89 44.5 12 123 61.5
113 22 11.0 79 56 28.0 45 90 45.0 11 124 62.0
112 23 11.5 78 57 28.5 44 91 45.5 10 125 62.5
111 24 12.0 77 58 29.0 43 92 46.0 9 126 63.0
110 25 12.5 76 59 29.5 42 93 46.5 8 127 63.5
109 26 13.0 75 60 30.0 41 94 47.0 7 128 64.0
108 27 13.5 74 31 30.5 40 95 47.5 6 129 64.5
107 28 14.0 73 62 31.0 39 96 48.0 5 130 65.0
106 29 14.5 72 63 31.5 38 97 48.5 4 131 65.5
105 30 15.0 71 64 32.0 37 98 49.0 3 132 66.0
104 31 15.5 70 65 32.5 36 99 49.5 2 133 66.5
103 32 16.0 69 66 33.0 35 100 50.0 1 134 67.0
102 33 16.5 68 67 33.5 34 101 50.5 0 135 67.5
Table 3: Consequences of less paid fees
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6. At the beginning of the first round, a hypothetical total fee for the fictional round 0
will be determined randomly. This fee will be between 1 and 135 cents. The cost and
audit probability for the first round will be determined according to the table above.
In all later rounds, cost and audit probability are determined on the basis of the actual
total fees paid by your group in the previous round.
7. At the beginning of each round, every player will be informed of the amount of your
group’s total fees paid in the previous round. This determines the current audit
probability according to the table above. (The following applies only in the partial
and the full information treatments: Every player is informed of the amount of fees
paid by every single group member.)
8. At the end of the 20 rounds, your individual income for every round is summed up.
The payoff of your participation in this experiment corresponds to your total income.
9. Subsequent to the 20 rounds, there will be a lottery. Afterward, you have to answer
a short questionnaire. The resulting payoff for your participation in this experiment
may be picked up during the office’s opening hours.
The experiment starts as soon as all participants are ready. Good luck!
B Questionnaire (extract)
1. Age (in years)
2. Gender (male/female)
3. Student of economics (yes/no)
4. Semester
5. Risk aversion (see Table 4)
C Screenshots from the experiment
Below are screenshots from the experiment. The experiment was conducted in German,
hence, everything shown below was translated into English.
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Please choose always the one alternative A or B you prefer. One of the ten lotteries you
choose will be selected randomly. You will be credited the respective result.
Option A Option B
Expected
payoff difference
10/10 of e 0.525 1/10 of e 0.75, 9/10 of e 0.41 e 0.08
10/10 of e 0.525 2/10 of e 0.75, 8/10 of e 0.41 e 0.05
10/10 of e 0.525 3/10 of e 0.75, 7/10 of e 0.41 e 0.01
10/10 of e 0.525 4/10 of e 0.75, 6/10 of e 0.41 e -0.02
10/10 of e 0.525 5/10 of e 0.75, 5/10 of e 0.41 e -0.05
10/10 of e 0.525 6/10 of e 0.75, 4/10 of e 0.41 e -0.09
10/10 of e 0.525 7/10 of e 0.75, 3/10 of e 0.41 e -0.12
10/10 of e 0.525 8/10 of e 0.75, 2/10 of e 0.41 e -0.16
10/10 of e 0.525 9/10 of e 0.75, 1/10 of e 0.41 e -0.19
10/10 of e 0.525 10/10 of e 0.75, 0/10 of e 0.41 e -0.23
Table 4: The ten paired lottery-choice decisions (Holt and Laury, 2002)
Figure 2: Information stage
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Figure 3: Contribution entry
Figure 4: Audit stage
34
Figure 5: Profit display
The screenshot shown reflects the situation in the no information treatment, where no
individual information is available. In both the partial and the full information treatment
individual taxes of every subject are visible.
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Who bears value added taxes? Evidence from
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Abstract Since 2007 value added tax rates were changed twice in Germany. On January
1st 2007, the regular rate was increased from 16 % to 19 % while the reduced rate remained
unchanged. On January 1st 2010, the rate on accommodation services was cut from the
regular rate of 19 % to the reduced rate of 7 %. Both tax rate changes are used to examine
who bears value added taxes. Therefore, difference-in-differences estimation is applied to
German consumer price data. The results show that consumers have to bear about 44 %
of the additional tax burden. In addition, I find tax incidence to be depending on the
market competitiveness. Finally, in the accommodation services industry prices respond
asymmetrically to tax rate changes.
Keywords Value added taxes · Tax incidence · Difference-in-differences · Consumer
price index
JEL classification H22 · H32
1 Introduction
Value added taxes are consumption taxes levied in more than 130 countries around the
world. This includes all OECD member states with the exception of the United States
(OECD, 2006). In these countries value added taxes usually raise more than one-fifth of total
fiscal revenues (Keen and Lockwood, 2010). Value added taxes offer many advantages as
they feature administrative simplicity and are commonly considered as economically efficient
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972).
Value added tax reforms are a popular and often used tool in fiscal policy. According to
European Commission (2013), 20 out of 27 member states of the European Union varied
their respective tax rates at least once within the last five years. Typically, there are two
reasons for tax rate changes. On the one hand, governments increase rates to enlarge fiscal
revenues. This was the main purpose of the German government when on June 29th 2006
then president Horst Ko¨hler signed a bill into law that provided an increase in the regular
tax rate from 16 % to 19 %. The law entered into force as from January 1st 2007 leaving the
reduced rate of 7 % unchanged. The tax rate increase was reasoned by the seriousness of the
fiscal situation in Germany. Spending exceeded revenues by far for many years (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2006). On the other hand, tax rates are cut to kick-start the economy. This
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was the intention when the rate on accommodation services was cut from the regular rate
of 19 % to the reduced rate of 7 % as from January 1st 2010 to advance economic growth
after the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009).
Value added taxes are indirect taxes. According to the basic principles in OECD (2006)
tax incidence should completely fall to consumers, i.e., the consumer share of the tax burden
should equal 100 %. However, it depends on the degree of tax shifting whether and to what
extent tax incidence actually falls on consumers. The main purpose of this paper is to use
both the 2007 and the 2010 tax reforms to estimate the incidence of value added taxes. The
results show that the consumer share amounts to about 44 % of the additional tax burden
with incidence being significantly higher in more competitive markets. Another finding is
that in the accommodation services industry prices respond stronger to tax rate increases
than to tax cuts.
These results are of particular interest for fiscal policy. Tax rate changes may lead to
changing consumer prices and hence, affect consumers’ real purchasing power. For instance,
in the case of tax rate increases the intended effect of increasing fiscal revenues may change to
the opposite when higher consumer prices lead to less consumption expenses. If tax incidence
had fallen completely on consumers after the 2007 tax reform, prices of commodities that are
taxed at the regular rate would have been increased by about 2.59 percentage points.1 The
German government wanted to prevent a slump in consumption expenses due to increasing
consumer prices. Therefore, unemployment insurance contributions were cut for financial
relief.2 However, without studies on the incidence of value added taxes in Germany it
is possible neither to conclude useful counteractions nor to evaluate whether the cut in
unemployment insurance contributions was appropriate in size.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, in section 2 a brief literature
review is presented. In section 3 the data is introduced. In section 4 I illustrate how I measure
the consumer share before the results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Most research on tax incidence is theoretical work. These studies can be distinguished
depending on the competitiveness of the market. Under perfect conditions tax incidence
can be shown easily as it is well known from literature that marginal costs equal price.
Since value added taxes are additional producers’ costs, assuming a perfect elastic supply
leads to consumer prices responding one-for-one to tax rate changes (e.g., Alm et al., 2009).
In contrast, the case of imperfect markets is more complicated with ambiguous results re-
garding consumer shares. Probably, the two most simple imperfect markets are the Cournot-
Nash and the Bertrand oligopoly. Both oligopolies assume identical firms competing in
quantities (Cournot-Nash) and prices (Bertrand), respectively. Price competition in the
Bertrand oligopoly leads to prices equal marginal costs as it is under perfect conditions.
Thus, taxes are fully shifted to final consumers. In contrast, many different incidence sce-
narios may result in a Cournot-Nash-model ranging from undershifting to even overshifting,
meaning that prices increase more than taxes with primarily elasticities and the number of
firms determining the actual degree of tax shifting. There are further imperfect markets as
monopolies and spatial competition. Prices will usually respond one-for-one in monopolies
1The regular tax rate was increased from 16 % to 19 %. If prices respond one-for-one, they would increase
by 100× 1.19/1.16− 100 = 2.59 percentage points.
2In Germany, unemployment insurance contributions are mandatory for all employees.
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while spatial competition typically leads to undershifting with decreasing consumer share
in less competitive markets (Katz and Rosen, 1985; Stern, 1987; Delipalla and Keen, 1992;
Hamilton, 1999). A general overview on tax incidence for imperfect markets can be found
in Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
Even though most developed countries levy value added taxes and despite the fact that
these taxes raise an important fraction of total fiscal revenues, there exist only few empirical
studies on the incidence of value added taxes. Carbonnier (2005) applies difference-in-
differences estimation to consumer price data to examine the impact of three valued added
tax reforms in France. His results show that price responses are stronger for increasing than
for decreasing tax rates. For less competitive markets he finds a consumer share of 91 %
after a tax rate increase and 22 % after a tax rate cut. In contrast, on more competitive
markets the consumer share amounts to 52 % after the tax rate increase and 130 % after
the tax cut.
Carbonnier (2007) again uses difference-in-differences estimation and consumer price data
to examine the effect of two value added tax reforms in France with the second one being
already included in his 2005 study. In 1987 the tax rate on car sales was cut from 33.33 %
to 18.6 % and in 1999 the tax rate on housing repair services was cut from 20.6 % to 5.5 %.
For both reforms he finds evidence for undershifting with 57 % of the tax relief on car sales
and 77 % of the tax relief on housing repair services passed to consumers. Due to the
higher competitiveness in the market for housing repair services his results suggest a higher
consumer share in more competitive markets.
Zapal (2007) applies difference-in-differences estimation to consumer price data to study
the 2004 Czech value added tax reform that included tax rate increases as well as tax cuts.
He shows that producers do not let consumers participate in tax cuts. For tax rate increases,
the consumer share of the additional tax burden is positive but small.
There are some more studies for United States sales taxes. Poterba (1996) uses clothing
prices for fourteen cities from 1925 to 1939 and for eight cities from 1947 to 1977 to examine
the incidence of state and local retail sales taxes. He finds evidence for undershifting for
the early time period and full tax shifting for the later period. Besley and Rosen (1999)
use twelve commodities to estimate tax incidence in 155 cities around the United States.
Their data ranges from 1982 to 1990. Using panel regression with fixed effects, they find
full shifting as well as overshifting. Both Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999) find
evidence that prices fully respond to tax rate changes within the first three to four months.
3 Data
The data used in this study is taken from the German consumer price index. It depicts the
average consumer price changes in Germany and is published as time series on a monthly
basis by the German Federal Statistical Office.3 The index is based on a basket of com-
modities that contains all goods and services German households purchase for consumption
purposes.
Currently, the basket of commodities consists of 667 different goods and services that are
combined into 106 classes, 42 groups and 12 divisions building up the overall index.4 Table 1
provides an overview of the structure of the consumer price index that is an adapted version
3Data is free for download at the GENESIS-online database of the German Federal Statistical Office,
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online.
4See https://www.destatis.de/EN/Meta/abisz/VPI_e.html for details.
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coicop-cpi item
07 Transport
071 Purchase of vehicles
0711 Motor cars
New cars
Utility vans
...
0712 Motor cycles
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1: Structure of the cosumer price index
of coicop by United Nations Statistics.5 As it can be seen from table 1 different commodities
as new cars and utility vans are wrapped up in the class of motor cars. The classes of motor
cars, motor cycles and other are a component of the purchase of vehicles group. This group
itself is featured in the transport division.
The price of each commodity is collected every month. To calculate the overall index,
the average price of each product is weighted according to a given pattern, resulting in a
weighted average. This pattern reflects the proportion of expenses that households allocate
for the respective product. Such a pattern is available for divisions, groups and classes.6
The consumer price index offers two major advantages for my purpose. First, all prices are
gross prices and hence, value added taxes are included. Thus, tax rates and price responses
on tax rate changes are implicitly incorporated in the data. Secondly, the weighting pattern
allows for disassembling and reassembling the index. This is particularly important because
the tax rate change should only affect those commodities that are subject to it. Therefore,
regarding the 2007 tax reform I must separate commodities that are taxed at the regular
rate from commodities that are taxed at the reduced rate or are even tax-exempt.7
Some classes have to be excluded from the analysis. The exclusion reasons are outlined
in the following.
In most of the 12 divisions the respective goods and services are taxed at different tax
rates. As it can be seen in table 1, division 07 consists of transport commodities. E.g., the
purchase of vehicles is taxed at the regular rate but many other transport services as short
distance train tickets or cab rides are taxed at the reduced rate. However, at the four-digits
classes level a unique tax rate can mostly be assigned. The 10 classes that are not subject
to a unique tax rate are excluded from the analysis.8
5Coicop is the abbreviation for Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose.
6The weighting pattern is available for download on the website of the German federal statistical of-
fice (in German only), https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Preise/
Verbraucherpreisindizes/WarenkorbWaegungsschema/Waegungsschema.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
7In the case of the 2010 tax reform this is much easier as only accommodation services have to be separated.
However, the following remarks apply for both the 2007 and the 2010 tax rate changes.
8I call a tax rate unique when each commodity of one class is taxed at the same tax rate. 58 classes are
completely taxed at the regular rate, 16 at the reduced rate and another 13 are tax-exempt. 9 further
classes show almost unique tax rates, i.e., at least 90 % of the commodities are taxed at the same rate.
These 9 classes are included in the analysis, too. A robustness check shows that excluding these 9 classes
leads to a slightly lower consumer share.
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Figure 1: Impact of classes with negative trend on consumer prices
Many studies recommend to measure inflation based on consumer prices excluding food
and energy because their higher volatility may result in noised data (e.g., Cogley, 2002;
Rich and Steindel, 2005). Indeed, food and energy feature a very high volatility and an
exceptional increase over time, especially for energy as four of the eight classes with the
highest increase from 2004 to 2009 belong to energy. Therefore, both food and energy are
excluded from the analysis.9
Moreover, I exclude nine classes that show a negative trend. All of these classes are
taxed at the regular rate. As it will be pointed out in section 4 I use differences between
commodities that are taxed at the regular rate and commodities that are not to determine
the effect of the tax reform. The basic assumption is that both types of commodities share
a common trend. As it can be seen in figure 1 this assumption is only fulfilled without these
nine classes. Therefore, they are excluded from the analysis.
Overall, 33 of the 106 classes are excluded. According to the weighting pattern, these
classes account for about 31 % of total consumption expenses of German households. With
regard to the 2007 tax reform the ratio of commodities that are taxed at the regular rate
and commodities that are not remains almost unchanged. This ratio equals 53 % for all
commodities and 51 % for commodities that are included in the study. An overview of all
106 classes, their respective (average) tax rates and whether the class is included in the
analysis is given in table 5 in Appendix A.
9Food is almost exclusively taxed at the reduced rate while energy is taxed at the regular rate. Including
both food and energy leads to a consumer share of more than 100 %. Excluding only food leads to an
even higher consumer share of about 145 %, while there is no significant consumer share at all if only
energy is excluded.
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As it is typical for time series data on a monthly basis, consumer prices show seasonal
patterns. I seasonally adjust the data at the classes level assuming a additive deterministic
component model.10 Thus, I adjust for seasonal effects before they get mixed up reassem-
bling the index.
The following analysis is based on the seasonal adjusted data for the remaining 73 classes.
I use data ranging from 3 years before the respective tax rate change to 3 years after.
4 Model
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the tax incidence of value added taxes based
on both the 2007 and the 2010 value added tax reforms. Hence, I am interested in how
much of the additional tax burden is shifted to the final consumer. Therefore, I proceed as
follows. First, I estimate the changes in consumer prices due to the tax rate change only.
Secondly, I calculate the changes in consumer prices as if prices would respond one-for-one.
Then, consumer share can be calculated as ratio of both price changes.11
The change in consumer prices due the tax rate change only is called the causal or treat-
ment effect of the tax rate change. 48 of the 73 classes included in the analysis receive
the treatment, i.e., these classes are subject to the tax rate change. They are said to be
in the treatment group. The remaining 25 commodities are assigned to the control group.
Assuming that all consumer prices share a common trend,12 no matter whether or not they
belong to the treatment group, difference-in-differences (DID)13 can be used to estimate the
treatment effect. If the common trend assumption holds the treatment effect is just the
deviation from this trend. This is visualized in figure 2.
In figure 2 two hypothetical time series for the 2007 tax reform are shown. One series
represents the treatment group and the other the control group. As it can be seen, there are
no systematic difference between the slope of both series neither before nor after the 2007
tax reform. Hence, the treatment effect is given by the offset, i.e., the deviation from the
common trend.
DID can be estimated by OLS. Then, the regression equation is given by
pi = α+ β trend + γ1 treatment + γ2 time + γ3 (treatment × time) + εi. (1)
The response variable is the consumer price pi. The dummy variable treatment equals 1
for commodities in the treatment group. Analogously, the dummy variable time equals 1
when the treatment is in effect, i.e., after the respective tax reform. The treatment effect
is given by the coefficient γ3 of the interaction treatment × time. The trend variable is
included to control for the usual trend in consumer prices.14 The error term εi is assumed
10Such an additive component model is given by Yt = Gt + St + It with Yt begin the response variable,
Gt the trend, St the seasonal component and It the irregular or random component. First, Gt is
calculated using a centered 12-month moving average. Seasonal and irregular components are obtained
by Yt−Gt = St+It. The irregular component can be subtracted by averaging the values of the combined
seasonal and irregular components for each month. The monthly averages correspond to the seasonal
component St. Finally, seasonally adjusted data can be calculated by Yt − St = Gt + It.
11Consumer share equals 1 if consumer prices respond one-for-one. Hence, dividing by this change results
in the actual consumer share.
12The common trend assumption states that prices in both the treatment and the control groups would be
identical without the treatment.
13See Angrist and Pischke (2008) for more details on difference-in-differences estimation.
14This variable equals 1 for the first observation, 2 for the second, and so forth.
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Figure 2: Common trend assumption (hypothetical time series)
to be white noise. Generally, this assumption does not hold for time series data because of
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, I correct the estimated standard errors based on White.
As noted above, the consumer share is given by the ratio of the treatment effect γ3 and the
theoretical effect if consumer prices respond one-for-one. The latter one can be calculated
easily. In 2007 the regular tax rate was increased from 16 % to 19 %. If consumer prices
that are taxed at the regular rate had responded one-for-one they would have increased by
100 × 1.19/1.16− 100 = 2.59
percentage points. Analogously, the change in prices for accommodation services after the
2010 tax reform is given by
100 × 1.07/1.19− 100 = −10.08
percentage points.
Then, the consumer share θ of the additional tax burden is given by
θ =

+
γ3
2.59
for the 2007 tax reform,
− γ3
10.08
for the 2010 tax reform.
(2)
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Figure 3: Overall effect of the 2007 tax reform on consumer prices
5 Results
5.1 Tax incidence after the 2007 tax reform
First, I look at the the 2007 tax reform. Therefore, I use the seasonally adjusted data
described in section 3 ranging from January 2004 to December 2009. I split the data into
two subsets with the first one containing the commodities of the treatment group. These
commodities are affected by the tax reform. The second subset includes the commodities of
the control group. The resulting time series are shown in figure 3.
As it can be seen from figure 3, before the tax reform there seems to be no systematic
difference between both indices. They fluctuate around each other with the index of the
treatment group showing higher variation. In January 2007 the prices of the treatment
group increases by about 1 percentage point more than the prices of the control group,
immediately resulting in an offset between both indices. Even though there is a similar
increase in the control group shortly after, the offset persists clearly. This indicates that
prices immediately respond to tax rate changes.
In 2009, the offset seems to be getting even bigger, indicating an increasing slope in the
treatment group that may result in a slight overestimation of the treatment effect.
To test this effect statistically, I apply equation (1) on the data. The results are shown
in table 2. As it can be seen from this table, the treatment effect is highly significant.15
Consumer prices increase by about 1.13 percentage points due to the tax rate change only.
15The treatment effect is given by the coefficient γ3 of the interaction between time and treatment, see
section 4.
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Coef. Std.err. Sign.
Intercept 97.78 0.08 < 0.01 ***
Trend 0.12 0.00 < 0.01 ***
Time 0.24 0.15 0.11
Treatment -0.01 0.09 0.90
Time × Treatment 1.13 0.13 < 0.01 ***
Consumer share: 44 %
Response variable: consumer price
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors, adj. R2 = 0.98
Table 2: Effect of the 2007 tax reform on consumer prices
As noted before, consumer prices would have increased by about 2.59 percentage points
if they had responded one-for-one. Thus, the consumer share θ equals 1.13/2.59 = 0.44.
The additional tax burden resulting from the 2007 tax rate increase is almost equally split
between producers and consumers. Consumer share is somewhat lower than in Carbonnier
(2005, 2007) and well below the results of Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999).
This is an important results for fiscal policy. Based on θ, it would be possible to calculate
the net effects of the tax rate increase and the cut in unemployment insurance contributions
on consumers’ real purchasing power.16 Moreover, this result enables politicians to estimate
price responses on future tax rate changes beforehand.
As noted before, about 51 % of all consumption expenses of German households are
apportioned to commodities that are taxed at the regular rate. This leads to an overall
increase in consumer prices of 0.51×1.13 = 0.57 percentage points due to the tax rate change
only. In the case of full tax shifting consumer prices would have increased by 0.51× 2.59 =
1.32 percentage points.
One should note the R2 of almost 1. This is mostly due to the fact that the upward trend
is almost identical for both indices. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient of this deterministic
trend is highly significant. The average monthly increase in consumer prices amounts to
0.12 percentage points. Both the coefficients of the time and the treatment dummy variable
are insignificant which implies that there are differences neither in the control group over
time nor between the treatment and control group before the tax reform.
5.2 Consumer share and market competitiveness
In section 2 it was pointed out that market competitiveness may affect tax incidence. Usually,
the consumer share of the tax burden will increases with increasing market competition.
Normally, goods are capital intensive and services are labor intensive. Assuming that
competitiveness in labour intensive markets is higher because of higher market entry barriers
this would lead to a higher consumer share for services compared to goods (Carbonnier,
2007). To examine this I split the subset of commodities from the treatment group into
further subsets with the first subset containing goods and the second subset containing
16However, this will not be covered here.
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Goods Services
Coef. Std.err. Sign. Coef. Std.err. Sign.
Intercept 97.92 0.06 < 0.01 *** 97.50 0.13 < 0.01 ***
Trend 0.11 0.00 < 0.01 *** 0.14 0.01 < 0.01 ***
Time 0.51 0.14 < 0.01 *** -0.30 0.22 0.18
Treatment -0.04 0.07 0.62 0.04 0.14 0.75
Time × Treatment 0.55 0.11 < 0.01 *** 2.30 0.22 < 0.01 ***
Consumer share: 21 % Consumer share: 89 %
Robust standard errors
Adj. R2 = 0.99 (goods) and adj. R2 = 0.96 (services)
Table 3: Consumer share and market competitiveness
services. The control group remains unchanged. Again, I will test this effect statistically by
estimating equation (1) based on these data. The results for goods and services are shown
in the left and right panel of table 3, respectively.
As it can be seen in table 3 the treatment effect is highly significant for both goods and
services. Prices increase by about 0.55 and 2.30 percentage points due to the tax reform,
respectively. The consumer share of the additional tax burden amounts to 21 % for goods
and 89 % for services. Hence, most of the overall treatment effect stems from services.17
The higher consumer share for services is theoretically expected and in line with the
findings of Carbonnier (2005, 2007). The difference in γ3 between services and goods is
highy significant (2-sample t-test, p < 0.01). Moreover, the γ3 coefficient for services is only
weakly significant smaller than 2.59 (t-test, p = 0.095), i.e., the additional burden of services
is almost fully shifted to final consumers.
Again, R2 is very high and the deterministic trend is highly significant in both estimations.
5.3 Asymmetric price responses
The tax rate on accommodation services was changed twice. First, in 2007 the tax rate was
increased from 16 % to 19 %. In 2010, this tax rate was cut from 19 % to 7 %. This allows
to test whether consumer prices respond asymmetric to different kinds of tax rate changes.
Regarding the 2007 tax reform, accommodation services remain the only commodity in
the treatment group. As in sections 5.1 and 5.2 all commodities that are taxed at the
regular rate or are tax exempt are included in the control group. Analogously for the 2010
tax reform, the treatment group consists only of accommodation services but the control
group comprises all other commodities no matter at which rate they are taxed. Again, (1)
is applied to the data. The results for 2007 and 2010 are shown in the left and right panel
of table 4, respectively.
As it can be seen from table 4 the treatment effect on accommodation services after the
2007 tax rate increase is highly significant. Prices for accommodation services increased by
about 0.99 percentage points. The consumer share amounts to 38 %. As before, R2 is very
high and the deterministic trend is highly significant. Regarding the 2010 tax reform the
1766 % of all commodities from the treatment group are goods. Hence, the overall effect is given by the
weighted average 0.66 × 0.21 + 0.34× 0.89 = 0.44. This holds for the other coefficients as well.
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2007 tax reform 2010 tax reform
Coef. Std.err. Sign. Coef. Std.err. Sign.
Intercept 97.68 0.14 < 0.01 *** 102.86 0.15 < 0.01 ***
Trend 0.13 0.01 < 0.01 *** 0.16 0.01 < 0.01 ***
Time 0.06 0.26 0.81 -1.23 0.30 < 0.01 ***
Treatment -0.00 0.19 0.99 -0.28 0.21 0.19
Time × Treatment 0.99 0.27 < 0.01 *** 0.43 0.27 0.11
Consumer share: 38 % Consumer share: 0 %
Robust standard errors
Adj. R2 = 0.93 (2007) and adj. R2 = 0.93 (2010)
Table 4: Price responses of accommodation services to opposing tax rate changes
positive sign of the coefficient γ3 might indicate that prices of accommodation services are
even increased after the tax cut. However, the coefficient is not significant. The tax relief
is not passed to consumers at all. Consumer prices respond stronger to tax rate increases
compared to tax rate cuts. This suggest asymmetric responses in consumer prices.
Note that the 2010 tax cut amounts to 12 percentage points. In contrast the 2007 tax
increase amounts to only 3 percentage points. Hence, effects of the 2010 tax rate cut should
be easier to identify.
I neglect the fact that not all prices of accommodation services are part of the tax cut
as breakfast is still taxed at the regular rate. However, this should only have a very small
impact on the results and cannot account for the missing price decease.
6 Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to determine the incidence of value added taxes based
on both the 2007 and the 2010 tax reforms. Therefore, I conducted difference-in-differences
estimation on German consumer price data. Using data ranging from 3 years before the tax
reform to 3 years after it, the results show that consumers have to bear about 44 % of the
additional tax burden after the 2007 reform.
In addition, I find incidence to be depending on the market competitiveness. As theoret-
ically expected consumer shares are higher in more competitive markets (89 %) than in less
competitive markets (21 %). Finally, in the case of accommodation services price respond
asymmetrically to tax rate changes. After the 2007 reform 38 % of the additional tax burden
are shifted to final consumers. In contrast, the tax relief after the 2010 reform is not shifted
to consumers at all.
These results are in line with previous studies regarding the incidence of value added taxes
by Carbonnier (2005, 2007) and Zapal (2007). As compared to the United States sales tax
consumer shares of value added taxes are clearly smaller. This may be due to tax salience as
usually, price tags show net prices (prices excluding sales taxes) in the United States. Net
prices do not need to be changed to shift taxes.
There are some limitations to my study. The tax rate increase in 2007 amounts to just 3
percentage points. Effects should be easier to identify for higher tax rate changes. Moreover,
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the offset between consumer prices that are subject to the 2007 tax reform and those that
are not seem to raise over time. This may lead to an overestimation of actual consumer
shares.
The results presented in this paper provide starting points for further research. It would
be interesting to examine whether incidence is constant over time by studying the 1993 and
1998 German value added tax reforms. Moreover, since most European Union member states
changed their value added tax rates within the last five years, it could be tested whether
incidence is constant across these countries. This is suggested by the results of Carbonnier
(2005, 2007) and Zapal (2007). Moreover, it could be tested experimentally whether salience
actually has an impact on tax incidence. Finally, the results are important for fiscal policy.
Consumer price reactions to future tax rate changes can be anticipated and hence, useful
counteractions may be applied.
A Classes of the consumer price index
Class Label
Weight tax rate
incl.
(in) (in %)
0111 Bread and cereals 16.44 7.0 no
0112 Meat 21.54 7.0 no
0113 Fish 3.11 7.0 no
0114 Milk, cheese and eggs 14.44 7.0 no
0115 Oils and fats 2.55 7.0 no
0116 Fruit 9.23 7.0 no
0117 Vegetables 10.60 7.0 no
0118 Sugar, jam, honey, chocolate and confectionery 7.70 7.0 no
0119 Food products n.e.c. 4.38 7.0 no
0121 Coffee, tea and cocoa 3.95 7.0 yes
0122 Mineral waters, soft drinks, fruit and vegetable juices 9.61 19.0 yes
0211 Spirits 1.88 19.0 yes
0212 Wine 5.56 19.0 yes
0213 Beer 9.03 19.0 yes
0214 Ready-mixed drinks with an alcohol content of < 6 % 0.09 19.0 yes
0220 Tobacco 22.43 19.0 yes
0312 Articles of clothing garments 37.10 19.0 yes
0313 Other articles of clothing and clothing accessoires 1.12 19.0 yes
0314 Cleaning, repair and hire of clothing 1.20 19.0 yes
0321 Footwear 9.17 19.0 yes
0322 Repair of footwear 0.29 19.0 yes
0411 Actual rentals for housing 203.30 0.0 yes
0431 Materials for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling 6.80 19.0 yes
0432 Services for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling 5.04 19.0 yes
0441 Water supply 11.09 7.0 yes
0442 Refuse collection 6.84 0.0 yes
0443 Eﬄuent disposal 9.35 0.0 yes
0444 Other services relating to the dwelling n.e.c. 5.76 11.9 no
0451 Electricity 24.61 19.0 no
0452 Gas 12.85 19.0 no
0453 Liquid fuels 9.21 19.0 no
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Class Label
Weight tax rate
incl.
(in) (in %)
0454 Solid fuels 0.79 13.2 no
0455 Heat energy 12.36 19.0 no
0511 Furniture and furnishings 22.16 19.0 yes
0512 Carpets and other floor coverings 3.11 19.0 yes
0513 Repair of furniture, furnishings and floor coverings 1.23 19.0 yes
0520 Household textiles 4.07 19.0 yes
0531 Major household appliances whether electric or not 6.76 19.0 no
0532 Small electric household appliances 1.04 19.0 yes
0533 Repair of household appliances 0.79 19.0 yes
0540 Glassware, tableware and household utensils 4.05 19.0 yes
0551 Tools and equipment for house 1.83 19.0 yes
0552 Tools and equipment for garden 3.10 19.0 yes
0561 Non-durable household goods 4.96 19.0 yes
0562 Domestic services and household services 2.77 19.0 yes
0611 Pharmaceutical products 9.83 17.6 yes
0612 Other medical products 1.21 19.0 yes
0613 Therapeutic appliances and equipment 6.51 19.0 yes
0621 Medical services 8.32 0.0 yes
0622 Dental services 5.59 4.0 yes
0623 Paramedical services 2.19 0.0 yes
0630 Hospital services 6.62 0.0 yes
0711 Motor cars 34.84 19.0 yes
0712 Motor cycles 1.23 19.0 yes
0713 Bicycles 1.43 19.0 yes
0721 Spare parts and acces. for pers. transp. equip. 6.62 19.0 yes
0722 Fuels and lubricants for pers. transp. equip. 35.91 19.0 no
0723 Maintenance and repair of pers. transp. equip. 20.32 19.0 yes
0724 Other services in respect of pers. transp. equip. 12.72 8.5 no
0731 Passenger transport by railway 5.53 16.0 no
0732 Passenger transport by road 1.15 7.0 yes
0733 Passenger transport by air 2.58 1.6 yes
0734 Passenger transport by sea and inland waterway 0.62 7.0 yes
0735 Combined passenger transport 8.44 7.0 yes
0736 Other purchased transport services 0.51 19.0 yes
0810 Postal services 2.28 2.2 yes
0820 Telephone and telefax equipment 1.60 19.0 no
0830 Telephone and telefax services 27.12 19.0 no
0911 Equip. f. reception, rec. and reprod. of sound and pict. 4.80 19.0 no
0912 Photogr. and cinematogr. equip. and opt. instr. 2.43 19.0 no
0913 Information processing equipment 6.98 19.0 no
0914 Recording media 3.40 19.0 no
0915 Repair of aud.-vis., photogr. and inform. proces. equip. 1.40 19.0 yes
0921 Other major durables for recreation 1.84 19.0 yes
0922 Other major durables for culture 0.82 19.0 yes
0931 Games, toys and hobbies 5.72 19.0 no
0932 Equipment for sport, camping and open-air recreation 3.04 19.0 no
0933 Gardens, plants and flowers 7.64 9.0 no
0934 Pets and related products 3.60 11.3 no
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Class Label
Weight tax rate
incl.
(in) (in %)
0935 Veterinary and other services for pets 1.53 19.0 yes
0941 Recreational and sporting services 7.38 14.0 no
0942 Cultural services 15.80 6.4 no
0943 Games of chance 5.81 0.0 yes
0951 Books 6.29 7.0 yes
0952 Newspapers and periodicals 7.76 7.0 yes
0953 Miscellaneous printed matter 0.93 15.4 no
0954 Stationery and drawing materials 2.58 19.0 yes
0960 Package holidays 25.93 19.0 yes
1010 Primary education services 3.16 0.0 yes
1040 Secondary education services 2.00 0.0 yes
1050 Tertiary education services 2.24 19.0 yes
1111 Restaurants, cafes and the like 28.81 17.9 yes
1112 Canteens 3.31 18.4 yes
1120 Accommodation services 11.87 18.5 yes
1211 Hairdressing salons and personal grooming establishm. 9.58 19.0 yes
1212 Electric appliances for personal care 0.49 19.0 yes
1213 Other appliances, articles and prod. for pers. care 11.47 19.0 yes
1231 Jewellery, clocks and watches 3.02 19.0 yes
1232 Other personal effects 2.80 19.0 yes
1240 Social protection 11.81 0.1 yes
1252 Insurance connected with the dwelling 1.98 0.0 yes
1253 Insurance connected with health 9.39 0.0 yes
1254 Insurance connected with transport 9.53 0.0 yes
1255 Other insurance 3.98 0.0 yes
1262 Financial services n.e.c. 5.34 4.5 yes
1270 Other services n.e.c. 5.08 12.5 no
1000.00 11.2
Weights are according to the 2005 weighting pattern of the German federal statistical office. Tax
rates are according to Elbel and Werner (2008) and after the 2007 tax reform. “Include” indicates
whether a class is included in the estimation. Exclusion reasons are outlined in section 3. Food
comprises classes 0111 to 0119, while energy comprises classes 0451 to 0455 and 0722. Classes 0531,
0820, 0830, 0911 to 0914 and 0931 to 0932 show a negative trend. All remaining exclusions are due
to mixed tax rates.
Table 5: Classes of the consumer price index
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